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Introduction
"I believe in my union."
1
"I believe in my caucus!"
2
Immigrants, people of color, and women form the backbone of
the United States economy today, and they are a substantial presence
in America's labor unions.3 The labor movement has struggled to
cope with the increasing diversity of its membership, and to change its
often-negative image on race issues, gender relations, and
immigration policy.4 Meanwhile, people of color and women have
banded together in caucuses and constituency groups when they felt
that the leadership in their unions has not addressed their concerns.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, caucuses were formed out of rank-
and-file discontent within unions. But, in recent years, internal union
caucuses have become less prevalent, and have evolved into
nationwide "constituency groups" that have become a mainstream
part of the umbrella organization to which most U.S. unions belong-
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO).
This Article examines the operation of new voices at work
through race and gender identity caucuses within the U.S. labor
movement in relation to the development of the legal doctrine that
defines the extent to which minority groups have bargaining power
with their employers and their unions. The legal landscape is
dominated by the "exclusive representative rule," by which the
majority union is the sole bargaining representative of all employees
in the unit whether or not they are also members of a minority
1. Interview with Subject No. 11, Black female member of the Service Employees
International Union African American Caucus, in Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 3, 2001). Pursuant
to the Human Subjects protocol under which this research was conducted, I promised
confidentiality to the people I interviewed for this Article. I will refer to the respondents
as "Subject No. _," and give their affiliations and relevant identifying information.
2. Survey Response from Subject No. 10, Black male member of the United Auto
Workers and the Black Rank and File Exchange (Dec. 29, 2001) (on file with author).
3. In 1986, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, 34% of
American union members were women and 21% were Black or Hispanic. In 1998, women
made up 39%, and Blacks and Hispanics comprised 24% of union members. PAUL F.
CLARK, BUILDING MORE EFFECTIVE UNIONS 161 (2000).
4. The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO) is the parent organization of affiliated unions representing approximately thirteen
million workers. The AFL-CIO's recent campaign to increase union representation,
called "Voice@Work," has targeted the large numbers of unorganized women, immigrants
and workers of color as fertile ground for building the kind of density the union movement
needs to survive in the Twenty-First Century.
caucus.5  Several scholars have argued that the exclusive
representative rule is outdated and should be repealed in order to
increase participation in the labor movement as a whole.6 Feminist
and critical theorists have added that the exclusive representative rule
prevents women and racial minorities from having their concerns
heard in white male dominated unions, and should be abolished or
relaxed to require employers to bargain with racial minorities or
women at the groups' request
In light of the foregoing debate, the questions examined in this
Article are: (1) Would immigrants, racial minorities and women, if
given the opportunity, prefer to bargain separately with employers if
their unions are unresponsive to their needs?; (2) Does the existence
of identity caucuses within the labor movement threaten unity within
unions or serve as an aid to unions' efforts to organize women and
people of color?; (3) What legal options are currently available for
dissatisfied minority union members and how could those options be
enhanced?; and (4) Are there reforms to internal union governance
which would serve the interests of women and people of color even
under the current legal regime?
In this Article, I argue that some scholars overstate the barriers
posed by the exclusive representative rule to the advancement of
women and people of color in their unions. Instead, the historical
evidence and my field research show that members of race and
5. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1998) (emphasis added) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
6. Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority
Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993); George Schatzki, Majority
Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should
Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975); Eileen Silverstein, Union
Decisions on Collective Bargaining Goals: A Proposal for Interest Group Participation, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1979); Clyde W. Summers, Questioning the Unquestioned in
Collective Labor Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 791 (1998); CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE
NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 174-76
(1988).
7. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1619 (1999) [hereinafter Labor's
Divided Ranks]; Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 66 (1995) [hereinafter
Crain, Women, Labor Unions]; Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination:
Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 395 (1993).
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gender identity caucuses have not favored the right to bargain
separately from their unions but instead prefer formal and informal
caucuses as reform movements within their unions. In fact, under
current law a minority caucus has several options aside from separate
bargaining that might be more effective at making its concerns a
central part of the union's agenda. Indeed, because of the weakness
of the employer's duty to bargain with majority unions as interpreted
by the courts, the interests of minorities and women are more likely
to be served by increasing the bargaining power of caucuses within
unions.
Recently, identity caucuses have attracted the attention of a
number of scholars. Some scholars have studied identity caucuses in
nonunion professional environments as alternatives to unions.8
Scholars also have studied the effects of minority caucuses in non-
union environments, such as caucuses of minority professionals in
California's Silicon Valley and large corporations.9 Other scholars
have argued that identity caucuses in unionized workplaces impede
solidarity among all workers and stifle the formation of a united front
against the employer.0 In this Article, I argue that identity caucuses
8. Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of
Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 161-62 (1993) [hereinafter Hyde, Employee
Caucus]. On caucuses within unions, Hyde writes:
I see the continued existence of caucuses within labor unions as a potential
antidote to some of the problems of unions: their bureaucracy, weak internal
democracy, and low rates of participation. An active caucus system could
encourage participation, provide loyal opposition to union leadership and create
a richer internal union political life without weakening the union in its relations
with employers.
Id.. See also Alan Hyde, Employee Identity Caucuses in Silicon Valley: Can They
Transcend the Boundaries of the Firm?, 48 LAB. L.J. 491, 491-97 (Aug. 1997).
9. Raymond A. Friedman, Network Groups: An Emerging Form of Employee
Representation, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 241 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1996)
(examining the success of minority "network groups" among Black professionals in largely
non-union settings); John Brown Childs, Beyond Separatism and Integration: The
Ramifications of African-American Caucus Groups for Today's Institutions, 12A STUD. L.,
POL. & SOC'Y 177 (1992); Roy B. Helfgott, The Effectiveness of Diversity Networks in
Providing Collective Voice for Employees, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 348 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne
Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000).
10. Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339 (1997); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON
DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS WRACKED BY CULTURAL WARS 226 (1995) [hereinafter
GITLIN, TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS]; MICHAEL J. PIORE, BEYOND
INDIVIDUALISM 164-66 (1995); Todd Gitlin, Beyond Identity Politics: A Modest
Precedent, in AUDACIOUS DEMOCRACY: LABOR, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE SOCIAL
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
are important checks on the white male majority rule still present in
many unions. Even in a labor movement that is continually becoming
less white and less male, caucuses will play an important role to
ensure that immigrants, people of color, and women in positions of
power reflect the interests of their constituencies. Further, my
research shows that identity caucuses in the contemporary context
have not been a source of division as feared by some. My research
also suggests that identity caucuses do not wish to supplant the role of
traditional unions. Instead of changing the law governing the
bargaining relationship between the employer and the union, the law
of internal union governance should be reformed to provide greater
voice for caucuses within unions.
Part I of this Article, The History of Minority Voices in the
Labor Movement, begins by examining the development of race and
gender identity caucuses in the context of the historical discrimination
against immigrants, women, and people of color within U.S. unions.
In the 1960s and 1970s, caucuses manifested minority discontent
within largely white male unions. The legal obligations placed upon
unions by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prevent discrimination
against women and minorities shifted the locus of minority protest
within unions from rank-and-file rebellion to the courts.
In the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, the character of
union caucuses changed to nationwide networks and formalized civil
rights committees in many union locals. The nationwide networks
have chapters in most large cities and recently have been officially
recognized by the AFL-CIO. In 1995, the AFL-CIO elected John
Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson to lead the
labor federation as the "New Voice" slate, promising a more inclusive
and invigorated labor movement. As one of its first official acts, the
leadership officially recognized nationwide identity caucuses, or
"constituency groups," as referred to by the AFL-CIO, which have
members in a variety of affiliated unions and chapters in most large
cities. These AFL-CIO "support groups" include the long-existing
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), the A. Phillip Randolph
Institute, the Labor Council on Latin American Advancement
(LCLAA), the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) (all
existing since the early 1970s), as well as the more recently-formed
Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA) and Pride at Work
(PAW) for gays and lesbians. In addition, the AFL-CIO and many
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 152-56 (Steven Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Gitlin, Beyond Identity Politics].
[Vol. 54
November 2002] RACE AND GENDER IDENTITY CAUCUSES
locals have Civil Rights and Women's Committees, while the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) and other large unions such
as the Amalgamated Transit Union have nationwide African
American, Latino/a and Women's caucuses. This Article explores
whether these internal committees and caucuses function as identity
caucuses under several possible definitions of the term "identity
caucus."
There is little dispute among the current leaders of the AFL-CIO
that certain identity caucuses should exist in the labor movement.
Indeed, the AFL-CIO has encouraged its affiliates and central labor
councils to encourage the formation of multi-union groups such as
CBTU and LCLAA. However, there is little discussion of exactly
what role these groups should play within unions themselves. The
roles that the caucuses currently play in unions, and whether and how
their role should be strengthened, are central questions addressed by
this Article. Part I concludes by searching for a definition of identity
caucuses, even though I recognize that "caucuses" are often informal
networks and community organizations that defy easy categorization.
In Part II of this Article, The "Problem" of Multiple and Distinct
Voices, I examine the shifting and temporal nature of identity, as well
as the multiple and intersectional identity clusters that many workers
hold. I analyze the arguments for and against caucuses using a
framework I call critical realism. In brief, this model is the merger of
Critical Legal Theory and Legal Realism in order to determine social
conditions as they are. In short, critical realism accepts the "critical"
view of the endemic nature of racism and sexism in the workplace,
but seeks to be "realistic" using social science methods in designing
legal reform programs in light of contemporary realities and the limits
of legal change. Thus, my analysis is based on the contemporary
realities of severe management resistance to unions in the private
sector economy and the enduring force of racism and sexism in the
United States.
Because the U.S. system of worker representation is founded on
employee choice, reforms to the system must be favored by workers
in order to reverse the precipitous decline of unionization in the
American economy. Based on my field observations of caucus
activity, I challenge the notion that identity caucuses are inherently
separatist and serve to fragment identities and solidarity among all
workers, because: (1) most caucuses do not exclude based on race or
gender, and many identities are represented; (2) many workers are
members of more than one caucus; and (3) caucuses have not sought
to change the bargaining relationship with the employer. I argue that
caucus activity is not only a drive for greater leverage of minorities
within the labor movement, but also a move for union democracy that
is based on group recognition rather than just individual rights. Race
and gender caucuses, I argue in Part II, are essential elements of a
union movement that respects race and gender difference and accords
women and people of color equal share of governance in white male
dominated unions. In this regard, I question the views of scholars
who believe that race or gender caucuses serve to harm worker
solidarity.1' On the contrary, identity caucuses have been central to
the formation and strengthening of unions in several cases.'2 I base
this argument on my field observations of race and gender identity
caucuses in the labor movement. Further, to submerge race and
gender identity fails to appreciate the permanence of racism and
sexism in the workplace and the need for bargaining structures to
ameliorate the current workplace problems faced by people of color
and women. Building the bridges to the community organizations
that are essential to the success of the labor movement will begin with
labor constituency groups and caucuses."
Feminist and critical theorists correctly point out that
constituency groups "ensure a mechanism for the voice of the most
oppressed groups in the decision making process" of the union. 4
Some of these scholars also argue for the repeal of the exclusive
representative rule, and argue that groups such as CBTU, LCLAA,
11. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 10; GITLIN, TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS, supra
note 10, at 226; Gitlin, Beyond Identity Politics, supra note 10, at 152; PIORE, supra note
10, at 164-66. In BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM, Piore writes:
[Miost important for an understanding of social policy at the current juncture,
among the structural changes that have worked to undermine the position of
trade unions in American society has been the gradual emergence of strong
organizations and group affinities based on sex, sexual preference, racial and
ethnic ties, religion, physical handicap and the like. These new affinities have
severely compromised the status of trade unions as representatives of social
grievances of any kind.
Id. at 19.
12. Ruth Needleman, Space and Opportunities: Developing New Leaders to Meet
Labor's Future, 20 LAB. RES. REV. 5 (1993) [hereinafter Needleman, Space and
Opportunities] ("independent spaces" like caucuses are places where diversity can be
encouraged and where women and people of color can gain leadership experience); Ruth
Needleman, Union Coalition Building and the Role of Black Organizations: A Study in
Steel, 25 LAB. STUD. J. 79 (2000).
13. Ruth Needleman, Building Relationships for the Long Haul: Unions and
Community-Based Groups Working Together to Organize Low-Wage Workers, in
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 71 (Kate
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
14. Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7, at 1619; Iglesias, supra note 7, at 496.
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and other community groups could replace traditional unions as
bargaining representatives for minority employees.'5 However, I
suggest that these scholars overstate the benefits and understate the
potential costs to minority employees if the exclusive representative
rule was to be repealed. Instead, I argue that efforts should be made
to institutionalize and strengthen the role of identity caucuses vis-d-
vis majority representatives. In effect, I argue for a revitalized union
democracy movement that privileges group interests over individual
rights, particularly with respect to race and gender concerns in the
workplace. I will also explore the views of people of color and
women in unions, as to whether they would prefer a system of
separate bargaining over a system that gives caucuses more
bargaining power. At the heart of this Article is the problem of trying
to achieve the elusive optimal mix of "exit" and "voice" in unions-
not just from the economic standpoint of making employees more
successful at the bargaining table, but from the standpoint of making
unions more democratic institutions that are responsive to minorities
even in a system of majority rule. 6 This Article argues for the
enhancement of the voices of minorities and women within unions,
rather than making exit from the union easier, because of the
wholesale legal changes that would have to take place to make exit a
desirable option. Finally, an exit strategy would leave union decisions
in important areas, such as union endorsement of political candidates,
untouched. Because imminent and wholesale reform of the law of
union-management bargaining looks very unlikely in the current
political environment, I conclude that it is more realistic to fashion a
system of enhanced internal union bargaining to increase the power
of caucuses and constituency groups."
The current legal options of union minorities are examined in
Part III, The Legal Landscape for Minority Voices at Work. This
landscape is dominated by the United States Supreme Court's 1975
decision in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization,' where the Court, in an opinion by Justice Thurgood
15. See Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7, at 1617 nn.372-74.
16. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 55 (1970).
17. Although labor law reform has often been touted as one of the labor movement's
top priorities, it did not occur during the eight-year Clinton Administration and does not
appear to be imminent during the George W. Bush Administration. See Outlook for
Labor Law Largely Unchanged by Election, AFL-CIO General Counsel Says, 19 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 29, 2001, at A-10.
18. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
Marshall, held that the employer had no duty to bargain with a
dissident group of African Americans who felt that the employer and
the union had failed to address discrimination in the workplace.
Emporium Cap well has been the target of justified criticism by many
scholars. 9 The Court concluded that the Black employees engaged in
separate bargaining, and refused to hold that their activity might be
protected under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) or the proviso to section 9(a) of the NLRA.2 0 Emporium
Capwell, however, does not present a substantial barrier to the
greater bargaining power of identity caucuses. Although a private
sector employer clearly has no duty under federal labor law to
bargain with identity caucuses and may even commit an unfair labor
practice by "bargaining" with an employee organization that does not
represent a majority of employees in the unit, this begs the question
of what caucus activity will constitute "bargaining" with the employer
in derogation of the exclusive representative. In Part III, I examine
the limits of Emporium Capwell and outline other options available
to dissident minority and female union members. These options
include decertification of the majority union, job actions not
authorized by the union, duty of fair representation litigation against
the union, and getting elected to union leadership. I examine the
merits of each alternative with a critical wariness of rights reforms,
and the realization that some modicum of legal protection is
necessary for people of color in unions." I also discuss whether
19. WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 256-66 (1977); Labor's Divided Ranks, supra
note 7, at 1560-62; Iglesias, supra note 7, at 422-28; Hyde, Employee Caucus, supra note 8,
at 160 n.38:
[T]he employees in Emporium Capwell could have negotiated binding individual
or group promises on job discrimination, had the employer been willing, and
could have enforced those promises in suit in state court. Nor were the
employees in Emporium Capwell unprotected because of the manner in which
they sought separate negotiations (that is, picketing the store); the Board had not
found that conduct "disloyal"; the Court of Appeals had remanded for just such
findings; but the Supreme Court held that § 7 did not protect minority bargaining
no matter how that demand was advanced.
20. The proviso to section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act protects the right
of
any individual employee or a group of employees.., at any time to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1998).
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dissidents' use of these remedies might lead to more strife within
unions than caucuses. I conclude that the present alternatives are not
effective at bringing minority concerns to the forefront of union
agendas. Instead, the greatest gains made by women and people of
color might be attained through organized caucuses that have greater
institutional status under federal labor law.
In Part IV, titled How Power Is Being Voiced at Work Today, I
examine case studies of people of color, immigrants, and women
asserting power in their unions. Ordinarily, these efforts have
coalesced around informal groups of workers of similar ethnic and
gender backgrounds seeking greater decision-making power in white
male dominated locals. Their concerns have often dovetailed with
those of the union democracy movement, joining forces with union
democracy "reform caucuses" such as Teamsters for a Democratic
Union (TDU) or the New Directions movement within the United
Auto Workers (UAW) to assert member control over union
leadership. This has particularly been the case with Latino/a
immigrants who in several historical examples have sought to assert
democratic power within their unions rather than attempting to
bypass the majority union. I argue that the goals of reform caucuses
and identity caucuses have converged and complemented one another
to increase minority clout within unions while at the same time
furthering the goal of union democracy. Besides case study accounts
of how workers of color and women have challenged power in their
locals as a means of determining whether identity caucuses can serve
as alternative representatives, I surveyed members of identity
caucuses in the labor movement today and found that they have a
strong faith in traditional unionism.
Finally, in Part V, or How New Voices Can Be Heard, I set forth
a framework by which the bargaining power of the caucuses may be
strengthened under federal labor law.22 In doing so, I am cognizant of
21. Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 741 (1994); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 302 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995); Linda Greene, Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra
at 292.
22. Although my proposals will focus primarily on defining and empowering race and
gender caucuses in labor unions, the legal framework could be utilized by "reform
caucuses" which seek more democratic unions but are not focused specifically on the
needs of people of color or women. For a discussion of reform caucuses in unions, see
MIKE PARKER & MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER: REBUILDING UNIONS
FROM THE BOTTOM UP 67-83 (1999).
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various pitfalls. First, the unwieldy, bureaucratic nature of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cautions against creating
new structures to enforce rights. Second, critical theorists have
cautioned against placing too much reliance on legal remedies as a
means of liberation for minorities and women.23 Third, the existing
law governing the relations of unions to their members-the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 ("Landrum-Griffin")-has been
criticized for being cumbersome and individualized." Finally, as
stated above, there remain many avenues in the existing labor law
structure for the operation of minority caucuses within and outside of
majority rule labor unions. Still, the bargaining power of minority
caucuses could be enhanced by reforms aimed at regulating the
relationship between the caucuses and the majority representative
union. In addition, as one scholar has pointed out, the caucuses can
play an important role in providing workers representation and
mediation of their grievances in cases involving discrimination.
The reforms that I propose relate to the nature of bargaining and
collective power, and are central even after race and gender
minorities attain leadership positions in their unions.26 Landrum-
Griffin should be amended to ensure that caucuses are not ensnared
by reasonable union rules against "dual unionism" and "disloyalty."
Other amendments might be necessary to allow for representation of
caucuses in union governance, in light of court decisions that have
struck down voluntary affirmative action programs designed to
diversify union leadership.27 These reforms will serve the caucuses'
interest in internal reform while preserving the unified bargaining
strength of traditional unions.
Caucuses have played an important role in helping women and
minorities win elections for union offices." However, the power of
incumbency and the usually uncontested nature of union elections
23. See authorities cited supra note 21.
24. Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. REs. 247 (2000);
Steve Fraser, Is Democracy Good for Unions?, DISSENT, Summer 1998, at 33-39.
25. Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 583 (1999) (discussing the role of identity caucuses in mediating Title VII disputes).
26. Other scholars have explored methods of achieving greater minority leadership in
unions. See Michael J. Goldberg, Affirmative Action in Union Government. The
Landrum-Griffin Act Implications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649 (1983); Michael J. Goldberg, Top
Officers of Local Unions, 19 LAB. STUD. J. 3 (1995). For recommendations concerning
proportional representation and other voting schemes to increase minority participation in
union leadership, see McUsic & Selmi, supra note 10, at 1371-72.
27. Donovan v. Illinois Education Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982); Shultz v. Local
1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
28. Needleman, Space and Opportunities, supra note 12.
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mean that people of color and women cannot simply rely on the
political processes within their unions to assert greater power. This
Article concludes by acknowledging that even in unions comprised
predominantly of women and people of color, internalized hierarchies
of race, color, ethnicity, national origin, and immigration status may
prevent solidarity among those of the same race or ethnic group. As
Marion Crain has argued, the ideologies of the labor movement
cannot continue unchanged if it is to fully incorporate women and
people of color into its ranks. 9 In order to give caucuses a greater
role, labor's ideology of "local autonomy," which insulates local
leadership from "outside agitators," must change. Caucuses and
constituency groups should be allowed to play a role in the processing
and mediation of grievances in order to assure minorities and women
that union officials who cannot relate to their concerns are not
ignoring their grievances. In order to regulate conflicts among
caucuses, the AFL-CIO can create policing structures similar to those
it has in place for the adjustment of jurisdictional disputes between
unions and the "no-raiding" clause of its constitution.30 The AFL-
CIO could also serve to facilitate cooperation between community
groups and local unions under this rubric. This kind of intervention
may be particularly important in the case of immigrant workers, who
for a variety of reasons may have greater ties to community groups
such as workers' rights centers."
At its core, this Article seeks an accommodation between the
current trend in labor and employment law toward individual rights,
and the principles of collective strength that make unions stronger
and more accountable to their members. Bargaining is too often seen
as a diametric employer/union process rather than a multilateral
process of negotiation within unions. In order for the labor
movement to survive, its leaders must recognize the need not only to
attract minority and female members into its ranks, but also to foster
and retain a sense of commitment by these members to the union
movement. It is too often assumed that unions should speak with
only one voice. However, I argue that the many voices within unions
29. Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7, at 1553-55.
30. AFL-CIO, CONSTITUTION art. III, § 8 (as amended Dec. 3-6, 2001) [hereinafter
AFL-CIO CONST.], available at http://www.aflcio.org/about/constitutionmain.htm (also
on file with author).
31. In this way, identity caucuses may also serve as centers of the kind of "citizen
unionism" which Katherine Stone advocates. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New
Psychological Contract. Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
need to be institutionalized and legitimated through caucuses that
reflect workers' diverse and multiple identities.
I. A Brief History of Minority Voice in the Labor
Movement-The Historical and Contextual
Need for Identity Caucuses in Unions
"At one point, everyone thought we [in CBTU] were communist
sympathizers. But CBTU was an advocate.... Groups like CBTU
and CLUW serve as escape valves."32
In order to determine the propensity of people of color and
women to demand changes in the way their relationship with their
unions is structured, it is useful to examine the historical context in
which identity caucuses arose. Viewing the history of mobilization by
people of color, and how it informs current debates about legal issues,
is consistent with the critical realist approach that I will take in this
Article.33 History is rife with examples of the union movement
subordinating the interests of people of color, immigrants, and
women to the interests of white men.34 The question then is how
these groups mobilize given these constraints, and what they believe
to be the most appropriate route to reverse their subordination. My
reading of history supports the conclusion that race and gender
caucuses found the basic representational regime that they were
confronting to be unproblematic and sought instead to influence
power within that structure. I will then examine how identity
caucuses have evolved into mainstream organizations in the U.S.
labor movement.
A. Racism, Sexism, and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the Labor Movement
The history of discrimination in the labor movement, and the
parallel history of subordination against minorities, women, and
32. Interview with Subject No. 6, Black female member of Coalition of Black Trade
Unionists, Coalition for Labor Union Women, and United Auto Workers, in Milwaukee,
Wis. (Apr. 3, 2001).
33. I define "critical realism" to be an approach that takes into account historical and
contemporary contextual evidence with the goal of challenging existing power inequalities.
See infra Part II.
34. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATION, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE
NEW DEAL (2001) (arguing that African American interests were not adequately
represented in the union lobbying that led to the New Deal legislation establishing
minimum wage and collective bargaining rights).
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immigrants in the United States, is well-documented . I endeavor
here not to catalog all of that discrimination, but to give a brief
context for the rise of identity caucuses in the era after the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Before the creation of the AFL-CIO in 1955,
there was a division between the skilled laborers in the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), and the unskilled, more racially and
ethnically diverse Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Even
after the merger of the AFL and CIO, many unions continued to
actively support and condone the segregationist ways of life in
mainstream society. The specter of Jim Crow that pervaded so much
of American society was also present in unions. Segregated locals
existed side by side throughout the first half of the Twentieth
Century, and into the 1950s, even after the merger of the AFL and
CIO. Six years after the merger, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People was still concerned about the
"failure of the AFL-CIO... to take decisive action against the
continued existence of segregated locals .... ",,36
As a result of continued discrimination, Black labor groups such
as Coleman Young's National Negro Labor Council (NALC) (1951-
1955) and A. Phillip Randolph's Negro American Labor Council
(1959-1965) were formed to advocate for the needs of Black workers
within the labor movement. In Randolph's words, the NALC
"reject[ed] black nationalism as a doctrine and practice of racial
separatism . . . .,. Detroit also had been a source of early groups of
Black unionists because of the confluence of the large numbers of
Blacks in the city and especially in the auto industry. The National
Association of Negro Trade Unionists formed in Detroit in 1956.38
Meanwhile, the Trade Union Leadership Conference (TULC) sought
35. See, e.g., PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER,
1619-1973 (1974); LABOR DIVIDED: RACE AND ETHNICITY IN UNITED STATES LABOR
STRUGGLES, 1835-1960 (Robert Asher & Charles Stephenson eds., 1990); DAVID
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991).
36. RICHARD ITON, SOLIDARITY BLUES: RACE, CULTURE, AND THE AMERICAN
LEFT 71 (2000).
37. Id. NALC became the A. Phillip Randolph Institute in 1965.
38. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEGRO TRADE UNIONISTS, RULES AND BY-LAWS,
available in Ernest Dillard Collection, Box 2, Folder 2-50, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University. The Preamble to the Rules and Bylaws states, in part,
"We declare that we as Negro Trade Unionists have a special responsibility for winning
our union organizations within the labor movement to the struggle for the rights of the
Negro people and other minority groups." Id.
to organize Black autoworkers to address issues concerning Blacks
and labor starting in 1957."9
Even though the Civil Rights Act of 1964 granted formal equal
opportunity to people of color and women, unions continued to resist
consent decrees implementing affirmative action plans designed to
increase the numbers of minorities and women in previously
segregated workforces. Minority caucuses and separatist unions gave
voice to people of color and women who opposed unions'
discriminatory attitudes. I will now focus on the role of caucuses and
constituency groups in the post-Civil Rights Act era.
B. Black Caucuses, 1964-1975
Black4°  caucuses arose out of the tension between
"integrationist" and "separationist" strains of African American
thought, and as a manifestation of the "Black Power" movement of
the 1960s.4 Much Black unionist activity paralleled the unrest in
urban centers where large steel and auto factories stood. From the
start, there was tension between a vision of Black power that wanted
to separate from established unions and one that sought to create a
Black workers organization auxiliary to the union. The first
manifestation of the latter strategy was the Trade Union Leadership
Conference (TULC), organized by Black unionists with UAW Local
600 at Ford's River Rouge plant.42 Georgakas reports that TULC was
part of the UAW bureaucracy by 1961."3
The Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM), often
cited as the prototypical example of Black separatism, burst onto the
Detroit scene in the late 1960s." DRUM sought to improve the
conditions of Black workers in unions. However, DRUM was not
only concerned with the status of Blacks, and many whites joined
39. ITON, supra note 36, at 71.
40. 1 use "Black" to denote a specific social group, and because it was common among
the Black Caucuses of the time. See Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
41. Childs, supra note 9, at 182.
42. DAN GEORGAKAS & MARVIN SURKIN, DETROIT: I Do MIND DYING 43 (2d ed.
1998).
43. Id.
44. Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 289 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993);
Charles Denby, Black Caucuses in the Unions, in AUTOCRACY AND INSURGENCY IN
ORGANIZED LABOR 137 (Burton Hall ed., 1972).
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DRUM's wildcat strikes (work stoppages unauthorized by the union)
at Dodge's main plant." DRUM also advocated on behalf of Arab
immigrants in the plant, and reached out to them by distributing
leaflets written in Arabic.46  Revolutionary Union Movement
caucuses soon spread to other UAW-represented plants," such as
FRUM at Ford's River Rouge Plant, ELRUM at Chrysler's Eldon
Avenue plant, and CADRUM at Cadillac. 8 Militant activity was not
limited to the UAW in Detroit. In the late 1960s, the United Black
Brothers of the UAW organized wildcat strikes in other parts of the
country.49 Black aviation workers in California and electrical workers
in Chicago also engaged in wildcat strikes in the mid-1960s
The tension between separatism and integration was most
pronounced in the Detroit UAW. The older Black workers of the
UAW formed the Ad Hoc Committee of Concerned Negro Auto
Workers, which was not prone to the same radical tendencies as
younger members of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers
(the "League")." The UAW responded to the Committee's demands
by appointing a Black to the International Executive Board and
opening staff jobs to "moderate" Blacks. 2 Meanwhile, the League
had more radical demands, including (1) recognizing the League and
its affiliates as bargaining representative of the Black workers with
the power to call officially sanctioned strikes; (2) doubling the wages
of all production workers; (3) reducing work hours to a five hour day
and a four day week; (4) refurbishing the grievance system so that
grievances are settled immediately on the shop floor; (5) calling a
general strike to achieve the end of the war in Vietnam. 3 Despite the
demand for separate bargaining, Philip Foner states that it was not
45. GEORGAKAS & SURKIN, supra note 42, at 43. A "wildcat strike" is a work
stoppage not authorized by the certified bargaining representative. Employees may be
disciplined or discharged for participating in such an action.
46. Id. at 50. Arab auto workers soon had their own caucus. See Michael W.
Suleiman, The Arab-American Left, in THE IMMIGRANT LEFT IN THE UNITED STATES
233 (Paul Buhle & Dan Georgakas eds., 1996) (describing the support of the two-thousand
member Arab-American Caucus for wildcat strikes called by the League of Revolutionary
Black Workers).
47. GEORGAKAS & SURKIN, supra note 42, at 51.
48. ROD BUSH, WE ARE NOT WHAT WE SEEM: BLACK NATIONALISM AND CLASS
STRUGGLE IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY 207 (1999).
49. Hill, supra note 44, at 289.
50. Id.
51. FONER, supra note 35, at 420.
52. Id. at 421.
53. Id. at 417-18.
clear whether the League sought a separate Black union or a
transformed UAW 4
James Geschwender's portrait of the League provides several
reasons for the League's success in the 1960s, and later demise, which
are probably applicable to many of the early Black caucuses.5 First,
the civil rights, antiwar, and Black power social movements of the
1960s provided ferment to the caucuses' activities. 6 Further, Black
autoworkers were entering the auto industry work force in large
numbers, especially in Detroit, so that certain shifts were comprised
entirely of Black workers. Finally, communist influences in the
union, which had been the only consistent voice for Black
advancement, encouraged the most separatist leaders of the caucus to
become leaders. 7
The Black caucuses of the UAW shared a vision of union
governance that transcended liberal reform. Instead, they sought a
transformation of all aspects of society, beginning at the workplace, to
a communist vision. Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin report that
DRUM publications regularly stated that the "overall struggle must
be fought on class rather than racial lines."5 The leaders of DRUM
mixed socialism with revolutionary Black Nationalism, while
consistently seeking shop-floor action on grievances. 9 However,
these communist ideologies also served to undermine the caucus, by
causing the League's list of external enemies to include not only the
UAW's leadership but also law enforcement agencies seeking to root
communism out of the labor movement. Other defects centered on
the League's position with other activists in the Black community of
Detroit. Those who were not willing to embrace the League's
ideology were attacked and alienated. Finally, the deteriorating
economy in the early 1970s proved to be fatal to the League's
existence as the auto industry faced massive layoffs, especially as the
54. Id.
55. JAMES A. GESCHWENDER, CLASS, RACE AND WORKER INSURGENCY: THE
LEAGUE OF REVOLUTIONARY BLACK WORKERS (1977) (historical and sociological
analysis of Black workers organization operating within the UAW in Detroit).
56. Id. at 162-66.
57. Id. at 172.
58. GEORGAKAS & SURKIN, supra note 42, at 44. Georgakas and Surkin challenge
the premise that DRUM was a caucus-"at least not a caucus of the type that UAW had
dealt with for thirty years. Caucuses fought within the union for control of the union." Id.
The authors argue that DRUM "did not want a reformed union per se, but to bypass the
existing organization and form a new one uncorrupted by past habits and customs." Id. I
proceed in this Part from the assumption that DRUM was a caucus, but I will discuss the
broad and narrow definitions of caucuses at the end of Part I.
59. Id. at 25.
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seniority system disproportionately affected Black workers. All these
factors led to the League's disappearance by 1971. Even after the
demise of the League, unauthorized worker actions erupted in the
Detroit auto industry during the early 1970s, though not all of them
led by Black caucuses. For example, a group called the United
Justice Caucus, a rank-and-file caucus within UAW Local 7, launched
a wildcat strike at a Chrysler plant in 1973.60 Both Blacks and whites
participated in the Caucus's actions, but the majority of the group's
demands centered on firing a racist supervisor.61 The United National
Caucus in UAW Local 3 also sought to unify Black and white
workers.62
DRUM maintained relations with the Harvester Revolutionary
Union Movement (HARUM) in Chicago, and the United Black
Brotherhood at the auto plant in Mahwah, New Jersey, and the Black
Panther caucus of the UAW at the General Motors plant in Fremont,
California.63  RUM caucuses also emerged at the United Parcel
Service (UPRUM), and among healthcare workers. 4 By and large,
however, most activity took place within the Detroit auto industry,
61where Blacks were 30% of the UAW membership.
C. Rank-and-File Protest Outside the Auto Industry
Caucuses and wildcat strikes were not limited to the auto
industry. A nationwide caucus of Black steelworkers called the Ad
Hoc Committee picketed the United Steelworkers 1968 convention
for more Black leadership in the union.66 At the convention, the
caucus also demanded the resignation of the white director of the
AFL-CIO Civil Rights department to be replaced with "a Black trade
unionist who can honestly represent Negro workers and act on their
behalf."67 There was also caucus activity in the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, when a dissident group called the Rank
and File Committee made up of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians
60. GESCHWENDER, supra note 55, at 190-93.
61. Id. at 190-91.
62. Mark Levitan, The Growth of the United National Caucus, in NETWORK: VOICE
OF UAW MILITANTS (Aug. 1975), available in Enid Eckstein Collection, Box 1, Folder 6,
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
63. Black Caucus Program: An Interview, in THE MOVEMENT (1969), reprinted in
THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK 254 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970).
64. BUSH, supra note 48, at 207.
65. Id. at 206.
66. Hill, supra note 44, at 310.
67. Id. at 327.
initiated a Department of Labor investigation of the union's lack of
minority leadership in the 1970s."
The United Paperworkers International Union (UPIU) also had
some Black caucuses, most notably the Black Association of
Millworkers (BAM) which was formed in Georgia in 1970.69 BAM
gave bargaining proposals to the UPIU and demanded "black shop
stewards on every shift and black representation on the international
union's executive board."7 When BAM's proposals were ignored by
the UPIU, the organization participated in litigation titled Myers v.
Gilman Paper, alleging violations of the duty of fair representation
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.7
In 1968, Black bus drivers in Chicago formed a caucus in the
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) called Concerned Transit
Workers (CTW), which staged a wildcat strike to protest the lack of
Black leadership in a local which was 60% Black.2 The strike was
settled temporarily when the local's president agreed to the strikers'
demands to improve working conditions, refrain from taking reprisals
against the strikers, and to ban retirees from voting for union officials,
because they almost always favored white candidates. After the
union repudiated the agreement, the CTW decided to strike again
and to form an independent union. The CTW petitioned the NLRB
for recognition, but the NLRB dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. 4 In light of this and other legal setbacks, as well as the
continued opposition of the employer, city officials, and the union,
CTW disbanded, but Blacks soon after won a number of seats on the
union's executive board. 5 The CTW's struggle for greater Black
control of union governance is emblematic of the difficulties faced by
people of color in unions even when they are a numerical majority of
the union.
Another municipal transit caucus formed in the late 1960s at a
time when membership in Local 100 of the Transport Workers Union
(TWU) in New York City was estimated to be between 50% and 70%
68. Id. at 304.
69. TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN, THE COLOR OF WORK: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE SOUTHERN PAPER INDUSTRY, 1945-1980, at 117 (2001).
70. Id. at 118.
71. Id.
72. FONER, supra note 35, at 402.
73. Id. at 403.
74. Id. at 404. The NLRB has no jurisdiction over public entity employers, because
those employers are exempt from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2002).
75. FONER, supra note 35, at 404.
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Black and Puerto Rican.76 The TWU Rank and File Committee
worked on a petition to decertify Local 100 as the bargaining
representative but was unable to obtain the necessary signatures. The
caucus aimed to change the leadership but was not opposed to having
white leaders. According to a leader of the committee: "We
welcome white participation both in leadership and membership in
this struggle; we never opposed it. We are not a black separatist
group, we seek change for all workers.""
Foner reports that most caucuses chose to remain in the union
rather than become independent unions. There were, however, some
exceptions. Unlike the Ad Hoc Committee of the Steelworkers that
fought inside the union unsuccessfully for two decades for greater
representation on the Executive Board, the Black union members at
Bethlehem Steel in Sparrows Point, Maryland, formed an
independent Black union.78 Blacks in Philadelphia formed a union
independent of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), but
soon dissolved after finding that they could have little influence with
the school district, since AFT was the exclusive bargaining
representative. They soon joined the existing Black caucus inside the
AFT fighting for diversity on the AFT staff and community control of
schools.79 A few independent Black unions also formed in the
building trades, notoriously one of the most exclusionary segments of
organized labor. The United Community Construction Workers of
Boston and the Trades Union Local 124 in Detroit were both begun
in the late 1960s as an attempt to get Black workers onto federally
subsidized construction projects.80
With a few exceptions such as DRUM and the League of
Revolutionary Black Workers, most of the Black caucus activity of
the 1960s and early 1970s centered not on demands for separate
bargaining or all-Black unions, but instead on multiracial activity
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 408. Foner states: "The group partially won its campaign for job equity and
then dissolved, having achieved more in a short time by acting outside the union than the
black caucus within the steelworkers' union had accomplished in nearly a decade." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 409. The construction industry, while governed by the National Labor
Relations Act and the exclusive representative rule, operates under different rules that
make multi-union representation the norm. Because there are many trades at a job, the
employer is required to recognize and bargain with several different unions, and the
disputes center around jurisdictional conflicts between the different trades, which are
usually fought out by the unions. For this purpose, the AFL-CIO maintains a
jurisdictional dispute resolution system. AFL-CIO CONST., supra note 30.
seeking to change the structure of union governance. These groups
rarely made a demand to bargain separately with the employer. Even
DRUM and the League, which made demands for separate
bargaining, did not place a high value on essentially becoming a Black
version of the UAW, which they saw as a partner with the company in
the exploitation of labor.
D. Chicano/Chicana Insurgency
There are several examples of insurgency by Chicanos and
Chicanas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, the
Steelworkers faced increasing militancy by Chicano/a workers at the
same time it faced the challenges posed by the Black caucuses. The
Steelworkers' merger in 1967 with the International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter workers brought an additional 100,000 members to
the Steelworkers, many of them Latinos/as.8" During 1971, a group
formed called the Mexican American Union Council, also known as
the "Chicano Caucus." Initially formed to increase Latino political
education and participation, it organized chapters in several major
cities and steel strongholds. 2 In Los Angeles alone, three thousand
members of Steelworkers Local 2018 were in the caucus.83 The
Comit6 Obrero, or Workers Committee, asked for increases in wages
and benefits and a bilingual contract. On June 16, 1974, Comit6
Obrero called a wildcat strike that lasted nearly two months. The
company responded by suing the union, which did not approve of the
strike at first, but after a month recognized and ratified the strike.
The company obtained a restraining order and $290,000 in damages.
The workers returned after the union leadership reached a settlement
with the company, who agreed to withdraw the suit for damages.
Although the workers were dispirited after the strike, their contract
improved by the next round of negotiations in 1977, according to
G6mez-Quifiones. 8
E. Immigrant Caucuses
Wildcat strikes led by Chicanos and Chicanas continued into the
1970s. However, there were several instances of organizations of
immigrants that grew out of the labor movement as caucuses and
81. JUAN GOMEZ-QUI4ONES, MEXICAN AMERICAN LABOR, 1790-1990, at 269-70
(1994).
82. Id. at 272.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 273.
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support organizations in their own right. The Comisi6n de Asuntos
Obreros y Sindicales was an arm of the CASA-HGT, a Mexican civil
and workers rights organization.85 They led a walkout at Price
Pfiester's Pacoima plant in Los Angeles, California. Under the
leadership of Comit6 Obrero en Defensa de Indocumentados/das en
Lucha (CODIL), an organization for undocumented workers, a
thousand employees engineered a decertification of the union at Price
Pfiester.
In the early 1950s, two trade union leaders in San Diego named
Phil and Albert Usquaino set out to do what many unionists believed
was impossible-to organize the undocumented. At that time, it was
not illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers, but the
threat of deportation was still used like a club whenever immigrants
tried to organize.86 The Usquainos formed Hermandad Mexicana
Nacional, the Mexican National Brotherhood, as an organization of
Spanish-speaking immigrants. With chapters in the cities of National
City, Oceanside, Escondido, and nearby San Diego, the membership
of Hermandad was comprised mostly of members of the Carpenters
and Laborers Union.87 By 1973, the Hermandad had several thousand
members servicing about 60,000 immigrants, and had opened chapters
throughout the greater Los Angeles area, as well as Oakland, San
Antonio, Chicago, New York, and Seattle.8 The Hermandad had no
paid staff, but members paid fifteen dollars a year to defray the costs
borne by the volunteers.8 9 Hermanadad also played an important role
organizing its members into labor unions such as the Teamsters, the
National Maritime Union, the UAW, and the Longshoreman's
Union.9° Because of the lack of Spanish-speaking organizers on the
staffs of these unions, Hermandad members were put on the payroll
to organize immigrant workers and translate leaflets into Spanish.9
85. Id. at 221.
86. This organizing took place before employing the undocumented was made illegal
by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2002), and before
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
threatening deportation of undocumented workers trying to organize a union is an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA. The effectivenss of Sure-Tan has been diminished by the
Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 1275
(2002), in which an undocumented immigrant fired in violation of the NLRA was not
entitled to the back pay because of his immigration status.
87. MARIO T. GARCiA, MEMORIES OF CHICANO HISTORY: THE LIFE AND
NARRATIVE OF BERT CORONA 291 (1994).
88. Id. at 293-94.
89. Id. at 294.
90. Id. at 296.
91. Id.
Hermandad continued its activities with unions into the 1960s and
1970s, but its focus turned to advocating for changes in immigration
laws and providing services for immigrants, as well as addressing
housing and health problems.92
With a few exceptions, rank-and-file caucuses worked with the
labor movement to improve the situation of their members with
"established" channels of dissent-litigation, decertification, and
challenging union leadership in elections. The caucuses rarely made
an attempt to replace the diametric employer-union bargaining
relationship into a multi-sided affair that had them bargaining
alongside the certified majority representative. As the social
movements of the 1960s and 1970s subsided, this orientation toward
established channels of dissent became more pronounced with
mainstream organizations like the A. Phillip Randolph Institute and
the Labor Council on Latin American Advancement.
F. From Caucuses to Constituency Groups, 1972-1995
The identity caucuses of the 1960s were largely made up of
members either of a single local or international union. The early
1970s saw the origins of multi-union caucuses of people of color and
women. At first, these organizations were looked at with some
suspicion by the leaders of the labor movement, but by 1995 they had
become official partner organizations of AFL-CIO, and are now
called "constituency groups."
(1) A. Phillip Randolph Institute (APRI) and Coalition of Black Trade
Unionists (CBTU)
The A. Phillip Randolph Institute (APRI) arose out of the Negro
American Labor Council (NALC) in 1965, headed by A. Phillip
Randolph and Bayard Rustin. APRI adopted an explicit
accommodationist stance, refusing to challenge the leadership of the
AFL-CIO but instead choosing to organize Blacks to support the
Federation's goals. This would include supporting the candidates for
political office backed by the AFL-CIO, including Richard Nixon in
the 1972 presidential election.
In 1972, a group of Black workers from approximately thirty-
seven different unions gathered in Chicago to protest the AFL-CIO's
neutral stance in the 1972 presidential election and to oppose the re-
election of Richard Nixon. 3 The group also called for the AFL-CIO
92. Id. at 320.
93. FONER, supra note 35, at 433.
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to organize the substantial number of Black nonunion workers, to
increase the number of Blacks in union leadership, to help end the
Vietnam War, and to support greater federal investment in Black
communities.94 By the time the organization met the next year in
Washington, D.C., it was officially denominated the Coalition of
Black Trade Unionists (CBTU), intending to work within the trade
unions on behalf of Black workers and their communities.
The new coalition caused concern among some members of the
AFL-CIO establishment, especially those who were working to make
Blacks an accepted part of the labor establishment, such as Randolph
and Rustin.95 Rustin believed that APRI had the support of the AFL-
CIO and its president George Meany, in its goals of encouraging
Black political participation and providing Blacks with the training
necessary to assume leadership roles in their unions.96 As such, he felt
that the CBTU was unnecessary and implied that it may in fact be
counterproductive. CBTU co-founder William Lucy of the American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, for his part,
argued that the APRI might itself be counter to Blacks' interests
because of its "unqualified defense of the status quo in the unions.""
However, CBTU maintained that it was not a "black separatist"
group and that it would not endorse separate bargaining.98
(2) The Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW)
At the same time that Blacks were organizing into caucuses,
union women were working within the labor movement in informal
networks without institutional support. Dennis Deslippe states that
women embraced a strategy of pushing for increased interest within
their respective unions in "women's issues," and of seeking allies
outside unions to meet their goals. 9" Their national efforts centered
around "a loosely formed coalition sponsored by the Women's
Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor" called the Women's
94. Id.
95. See All About APRI, at http://www.aprihq.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
96. FONER, supra note 35, at 434.
97. Id.
98. Id. This remains the philosophy of the organization today. See About CBTU, at
http://www.cbtu.org/cbtuabout.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2002):
CBTU is not a black separatist or civil rights organization. It is the fiercely
independent voice of black workers within the trade union movement,
challenging organized labor to be more relevant to the needs and aspirations of
Black and poor workers.
99. DENNIS A. DESLIPPE, "RIGHTS, NOT ROSES": UNIONS AND THE RISE OF
WORKING-CLASS FEMINISM, 1945-80, at 25 (2000).
Bureau Coalition, which included nonlabor women's interest groups
and professional organizations."° This coalition lasted into the 1970s.
In addition, a short-lived group called United Union Women held a
convening conference in Chicago in 1968 but the organization was
inactive by the early 1970s.' '
In 1973, a group of eight women from industrial trade unions in
the Midwest convened a meeting that attracted about two hundred
women. The large turnout called for a national conference the next
year. "2 Thus, the Coalition for Labor Union Women (CLUW) was
formed in 1974.'03 According to Nancy Gabin, CLUW was committed
to "advancing the position of women both as workers and as
unionists" by organizing women workers, demanding "sex-blind"
treatment in the workplace, and encouraging women to become more
active and to gain a larger share of power in their unions." Deslippe
describes CLUW's philosophy as follows: "[Women in CLUW]
criticized organized labor's practices but also rejected solutions that
bypassed unions."'"5  CLUW vice-president Addie Wyatt of the
Amalgamated Meatcutters union told those in attendance at the
inaugural Chicago meeting:
Remember, we are not each other's enemies .... Our unions are
not the enemies, because we are the unions .... We are telling our
unions that we are ready and capable to fight .... CLUW president
Olga Madar suggested in the group's newsletter that women
workers hold men 'accountable through the political process' in
union elections.' °
CLUW feminists placed most of the blame for inequality on
employers.0 7 Although they educated women in general terms about
Title VII, CLUW leaders did not promote the filing of charges against
unions."' Leaders of CLUW also supported union seniority systems
in the face of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
challenges under Title VII. The closest thing to an official position on
the issue was the statement that "[b]rother and [s]ister workers
should not be penalized for the past discrimination of
100. Id.
101. NANCY F. GABIN, FEMINISM IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT: WOMEN AND THE
UNITED AUTO WORKERS, 1935-1975, at 225 (1990).
102. Id. at 226.
103. DESLIPPE, supra note 99, at 8, 143-45. Deslippe examines other instances where
union women differed with the goals of other feminist organizations, such as the Equal
Rights Amendment and the Equal Pay Act.
104. GABIN, supra note 101, at 226.
105. DESLIPPE, supra note 99, at 193.
106. Id. at 143-44 (internal citations omitted).
107. Id. at 193.
108. Id.
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management"-the import of which clearly sought to preserve union
seniority principles even as it recognized that management had
engaged in unlawful discrimination against women.' °  A dissident
group within CLUW believed that the leadership was wrong in not
challenging the seniority system. The organization avoided a more
serious rupture by virtue of the Supreme Court's decisions upholding
seniority systems but ordering remedial measures for the victims of
discrimination." ° CLUW President Gloria Johnson spoke in 1974 of
the need to avoid forming a "feminist union": "We already have the
structure to make change .... If there are women who feel unions
are not doing enough then it points up the need for them to become
more involved and initiate change.'' ll  CLUW officer and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers leader Joyce Miller added in 1975:
"We are loyal to our unions. Within that framework, we want to
advance the role of women.""' 2
CLUW was at the center of what Deslippe describes as the
"fragile coalition between working-class and middle-class feminists"
as both camps worked for pay equity, the Equal Rights Amendment,
and reproductive rights."' CLUW's membership increased from six
thousand members in the late 1970s to eighteen thousand members in
the mid 1980s.' 4  Although CLUW advocates plainly created the
organization as a "separate space" for women, there were union
leaders both inside and outside the organization that feared the
consequences of such a move."' CLUW leaders cautioned that too
much separation from the mainstream would lead to divisive and
counterproductive "antimale attitudes.""6
The divisions among CLUW members show the internal rifts
between feminists over labor's policy choices. Eventually, these rifts
were either healed or made moot by events such as court decisions.
However, on both sides of these policy debates lay the fundamental
109. Id.
110. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
111. DESLIPPE, supra note 99, at 188-89.
112. GABIN, supra note 101, at 226.
113. DESLIPPE, supra note 99, at 190.
114. Id. at 191.
115. See Enid Eckstein, The Two Souls of CLUW, in NETWORK: VOICE OF UAW
MILITANTS (Nov. 1975), available in Enid Eckstein Collection, Box 1, Folder 6, Archives
of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University; Cindy Jaquith, Setting the Record
Straight on Debate at CLUW Convention, THE MILITANT (Dec. 1975); Janna Pellusch
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University.
116. Lois S. Gray, The Route to the Top: Female Union Leaders and Union Policy, in
WOMEN AND UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 378, 390 (Dorothy S. Cobble ed.,
1993).
assumption that women should continue to work within their unions
for change. There is little evidence that women sought to form
separate women's unions or bargain with their employers in all-
female units. One counterexample is the separation of the virtually
all-female Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) from the male
Allied Pilots Association in the 1960s. This is an odd case, however,
because the nature of the work of the attendants and the pilots was so
different that hierarchy and discrimination were bound to result
within the union.'17 In addition, many of the waitresses in the Hotel
and Restaurant Employees Union wanted to maintain separate locals
in the 1960s, but this wish was complicated by the legal environment
changed by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. '18 Like the
Black caucuses, however, there were only isolated examples of
women calling for separate bargaining. By and large, these groups
formed internal caucuses within the exclusive representation system.
(3) Labor Council on Latin American Advancement (LCLAA)
At about the same time as the formation of the CBTU and
CLUW, the Labor Council on Latin American Advancement
(LCLAA) began at a founding conference in Washington, D.C., in
November 1973. LCLAA began as a way to increase Latino/a
participation in the labor movement. Its founding was met with some
disdain from rank-and-file activists who saw it as simply an arm of
George Meany, then-president of the AFL-CIO. Meany, in fact,
spoke at LCLAA's founding convention, where he pledged the
Federation's full support and cooperation, and "rhetorically insisted
on [LCLAA's] independence.""' LCLAA's primary function was to
enhance the AFL-CIO's electoral influence by mobilizing Latino/a
voters in support of candidates and community issues favorable to
labor." Although LCLAA favored greater organizing of the Latino
community, this was a secondary goal that it did not support with any
117. GEORGIA PANTER NIELSEN, FROM SKY GIRL TO FLIGHT ATTENDANT: WOMEN
AND THE MAKING OF A UNION (1982); see also SAMUEL B. BACHARACH ET AL.,
MUTUAL AID AND UNION RENEWAL: CYCLES OF LOGICS OF ACTION 93-127 (2001)
(history of AFA).
118. See DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 186, 200 (1991) (despite the discrimination faced by female
waitresses in HERE, they did not seek to form their own national division or international
union). See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 393
(D.D.C. 1972) (court held that maintenance of sex-segregated locals is a per se violation of
the Civil Rights Act).
119. See GARCfA, supra note 87, at 228.
120. Id. at 230.
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resources."' By 1986, there were eighty-seven chapters in twenty-six
states, but when membership in industrial unions such as the UAW
and the Steelworkers decreased, LCLAA membership also declined.
By 1988, LCLAA's effectiveness at raising awareness of Latino
issues in the labor movement was criticized even by its leaders. In his
speech to the 1988 LCLAA national convention, LCLAA president
Jack Otero said, "there are many in the house of labor today who are
still deaf and blind when it comes to Hispanics, our issues, our
aspirations. '  LCLAA was not in step with other Latino/a
organizations when it decided to endorse the Simpson-Mazzoli bill in
1986-the legislation that eventually imposed employer sanctions for
the hiring of undocumented immigrants. LCLAA's isolation on this
issue from other Latino/a advocacy groups is not surprising given the
AFL-CIO's position in support of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986. LCLAA did very little independent advocacy
on the bill, leaving that mostly to the AFL-CIO. This history suggests
that differences between immigrant workers and established Latino/a
caucuses necessitate immigrant-worker centered caucuses and
constituency groups."'
The continuing influx of immigrants into the labor force, even
after the passage of Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986,
has caused the AFL-CIO to reevaluate and change its position on
sanctions. Even before the labor federation's official policy change,
some in LCLAA were advocating the need to unionize both
documented and undocumented immigrants.1 14 At the same time,
LCLAA recently has taken a greater role in helping local unions to
organize the immigrant workforce in some cities where bilingual
121. Id.
122. Id. at 231.
123. Many immigrant worker centers started during the 1990s. See MIRIAM CHING
YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS TAKE ON THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001) (exploring Asian Immigrant Women Advocates in Oakland
and Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates in Los Angeles); Jennifer Gordon, We Make
the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The Workpiace Project, and the Struggle for
Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995). The AFL-CIO in California also
started a program specifically for immigrant workers-the California Immigrant Workers
Association. Robert Lazo, Latinos and the AFL-CIO: The California Immigrant Workers
Association as an Important New Development, 4 LA RAZA L.J. 22 (1991).
124. See Alma Flores, Latinos, Immigration & Labor: A Critical Challenge to the Labor
Movement, in PROGRAM OF THE LABOR COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICAN
ADVANCEMENT TWELFTH NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING IN SAN JUAN PUERTO
RICO, AUG. 19-23, 1998, at 12 (on file with author); LCLAA Writers Committee,
LCLAA Pushes Amnesty and Right to Organize at People's Economic Summit, AFL-CIO
MILWAUKEE LABOR PRESS, Dec. 13, 2001, at 16.
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organizers are few and far between. Certain individual chapters have
taken a role in local union affairs on behalf of monolingual Spanish
speakers, where English-speaking union staffs are unable to
communicate with immigrant members. LCLAA members in
Milwaukee, for example, helped to organize a steel plant with a large
immigrant Latino/a workforce, and have assisted by translating the
collective bargaining agreement into Spanish.'25  Like other
constituency groups, LCLAA sees itself as an aide to organizing,
rather than a potential replacement for traditional unions. The
president of the Milwaukee chapter of LCLAA, Joe "Pepe" Oulahan,
summed it up as follows: "While the focus of our organization is on
the issues related to Latina and Latino workers, LCLAA is
fundamentally dedicated to broadening and strengthening a unified
labor movement." 1
26
(4) The 1990s: APALA, PAW and AFL-CIO Recognition of Identity
Caucuses as "Constituency Groups"
The 1990s saw the continued efforts of constituency groups in
elections of governmental representatives and to stabilize gains made
by women, Blacks, Latinos/as. The early 1990s also saw the
formation of caucuses for union members who were still fighting for
visibility and legal rights. The Asian Pacific American Labor
Alliance (APALA) formed in 1992 to encourage greater participation
of Asian Americans within unions, and to support stronger relations
between the labor movement and the Asian American community.1
27
This agenda has resulted in such concrete projects as translating
union campaign literature into Asian languages, working with the
AFL-CIO to design a program to recruit and train new Asian
organizers, and working politically on behalf of immigrants and
affirmative action.
125. Steelworkers at Kramer Okay First Contract, AFL-CIO MILWAUKEE LABOR
PRESS, Aug. 31, 2000, at 7 (how LCLAA served as an interpreter for steelworkers in a
plant that was 89% Latino/a); LCLAA Writers Committee, Milwaukee LCLAA Assists
USWA in Kramer Victory, AFL-CIO MILWAUKEE LABOR PRESS, Dec. 16, 1999, at 9
(quoting United Steelworkers of America organizer Debra Rutkowski: "They [LCLAA]
really helped us get through the language barrier. There's a need for this kind of
organization.").
126. LCLAA's Oulahan Speaks for Latino Workers, AFL-CIO MILWAUKEE LABOR
PRESS, May 25, 2000, at 12 (quoting Oulahan's speech at a rally on in support of
Steelworkers union members).
127. May Chen & Kent Wong, The Challenge of Diversity and Inclusion in the AFL-
CIO, in NEW LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY 185, 192 (Gregory Mantsios
ed., 1998).
128. Id. at 195.
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Pride at Work (PAW) has the challenge of advocating on behalf
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender workers even as anti-gay
sentiment continues to be open and virulent in the workplace. 9
PAW formed in 1994 as a vehicle to end homophobia in the labor
movement and win things important to gays and lesbians at the
bargaining table, such as domestic partner benefits.' By its 1996
meeting, PAW adopted a resolution supporting affiliation with the
AFL-CIO as a recognized constituency group on a par with CBTU,
LCLAA, APALA and other such groups. That affiliation came a
year later. Official recognition eventually resulted in the AFL-CIO
committing funds to opening a national office and hiring an executive
director. 3'
The leadership that the AFL-CIO elected in 1995-Sweeney,
Chavez-Thompson, and Trumka-ran with a campaign promise to
bring identity caucuses, or "constituency groups" as they are called by
the AFL-CIO, into the mainstream of the labor movement. Once
elected, the leadership passed a resolution supporting the
constituency groups.'32 This support included providing each group
with funding for an executive director position and national office in
Washington, D.C. Chapter activities are funded by the local chapters
themselves and rely heavily on the volunteer efforts of the chapter
members. As in the past, these groups have continued to mobilize
around candidates for state and local elected offices, and political
issues such as immigrant rights and international issues germane to
their communities. Being financially supported by the AFL-CIO
means that dissent from the federation's policies is less likely, but
most activists in the constituency groups feel that there is less reason
to criticize the New Voice leadership of the AFL-CIO than with prior
leaders of the federation.'33 Still, constituency group leaders have
129. See Miriam Frank, Hard Hatted Women: Lesbians in the Building Trades, 8 NEW
LAB. F. 25 (Spring/Summer 2001); Desma Holcomb & Nancy Wohlforth, The Fruits of
Our Labor: Pride at Work, 8 NEW LAB. F. 9 (Spring/Summer 2001).
130. Christian A. Bain, A Short History of Lesbian and Gay Labor Activism in the
United States, in LABORING FOR RIGHTS: UNIONS AND SEXUAL DIVERSITY ACROSS
NATIONS 58, 76-77 (Gerald Hunt ed., 1999).
131. Kent Wong, Toward a Gay-Labor Alliance, in OUT AT WORK: BUILDING A GAY-
LABOR ALLIANCE 240, 241 (Kitty Krupat & Patrick McCreery eds., 2001).
132. AFL-CIO, 21ST BIENNIAL CONVENTION RESOLUTION (Sept. 1995) (on file with
author).
133. Chen & Wong, supra note 127, at 186-87. Dissent does occur despite the financial
support identity caucuses receive from the AFL-CIO. In the early 1990s, APALA was
one of the first union organizations to oppose sanctions imposed on employers for the
hiring of undocumented workers. The AFL-CIO in 1999 changed its policy to oppose
sanctions. Holcomb & Wohlforth, supra note 129, at 10.
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sometimes questioned whether official recognition by the AFL-CIO
has co-opted the constituency groups.'3 4 Kent Wong and May Ying
Chen, leaders of APALA, recently wrote:'35
[Constituency] groups have had mixed success. Where they have
played a strong role as forums for discussion, mutual support and
leadership development, they have produced committed and
effective new leaders to diversify the AFL-CIO, and they have
informed and changed the union's usual mode of business. On the
other hand, where they have been marginalized and reduced to the
status of tokens within the wider labor movement, they have simply
provided perks and rewards for obedient minority-group members
of organized labor.'36
The measure of constituency group effectiveness, according to
Chen and Wong, is the character of the leadership and their
willingness "1) to press labor unions and the AFL-CIO to provide
meaningful representation and equal treatment; and 2) to build
solidarity across diverse communities within the labor movement,
breaking beyond the specific agendas of particular groups."'37 Chen
and Wong conclude that even as "token organizations," the groups
are a statement of the need for "organized labor to respond to all of
its diverse members in the patchwork quilt of union democracy.""38
The constituency groups of the AFL-CIO thus are varied in their
approaches to serving their communities and constituencies, and in
their attitudes about their proper function in the broader labor
movement. The groups also differ in their rules about who can be a
member, which will be described in greater detail below. Moreover,
the individual chapters are also diverse not only in their tactics and
willingness to involve themselves in local union politics, but also the
racial and gender makeup of the organizations. As a consequence,
the effectiveness of the constituency groups in representing the
interests of workers of color and women workers will vary from state
to state. These variances will be discussed further below.
(5) Internal Union Caucuses and Committees
In addition to the constituency groups that consist of a number of
different unions, many unions have caucuses for their own members.
Thus, the Teamsters have a Women's Caucus, a Hispanic Caucus, a
134. See, e.g., Holcomb & Wohlforth, supra note 129.
135. Chen & Wong, supra note 127, at 191.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 192.
138. Id.
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National Black Caucus, and a Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
Transgender Caucus.'39 The Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) has
a Latino Caucus and a Women's Caucus." The Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) has a National African American Caucus
(AFRAM), as well as a Lavender Caucus. '  Although historically
caucuses were based in local unions, few local unions today have their
own identity caucuses. Instead, many locals have Committees on
Civil Rights or Human Rights that may function like internal
caucuses. The Committees have degrees of responsibility that vary
from union to union, but in some cases, like in the UAW, they serve
an adjudicative function for grievances relating to discrimination
against individuals in protected categories.142
Unlike the multi-union constituency groups, the internal
caucuses have an expertise with their unions that gives them an
advantage in dealing with internal union matters. However, the
internal union caucuses and committees have been subject to the
same criticisms as the constituency groups in that they are often seen
as beholden to the union leadership.' Nonetheless, these committees
and caucuses in many unions are relatively new phenomena and a
response to the increasing diversity of unions. The role of the
committees in most unions does not include direct involvement in
bargaining or grievance processing. 44
G. The Difficulty in Defining "Identity Caucuses"
The many forms that worker protest and organization have taken
throughout history highlight the difficulty in achieving a definition of
139. See Teamsters Online: Human Rights Commission, at http://www.teamsters.
org/hrc/about.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
140. Amalgamated Transit Union, available at http://atulc.50megs.com (last visited Jan.
15, 2002).
141. Miriam Frank, Lesbian and Gay Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, in
LABORING FOR RIGHTS: UNIONS AND SEXUAL DIVERSITY ACROSS NATIONS 87, 95
(Gerald Hunt ed., 1999).
142. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, CONSTITUTION art. 26, § 5
(adopted June 1992) [hereinafter UAW CONST.].
143. Bill Fletcher, Jr., Whose Democracy? Organized Labor and Member Control, in
NEW LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY 202,221 (Gregory Mantsios ed., 1998)
("All too often membership committees serve as rubber stamps for the union staff.");
Wong & Chen, supra note 127, at 191 ("Some [ethnic and women's committees] have
failed to provide meaningful political representation for the excluded groups, or have
served only as social organizations, supporting the union agenda without criticism.").
144. One exception is the UAW Constitution, which requires all grievances involving
race, sex, and disability to be processed by the Civil Rights Committee, which is
mandatory in each local union. See UAW CONST., supra note 142, art. 26, § 5.
"identity caucus" that would apply to all types of worker
organizations within unions. In the late 1960s, rank-and-file protest
movements such as DRUM erupted at different worksites but were
largely confined to members of one international union-the UAW.
Starting in the 1970s, networks such as CBTU and LCLAA were
created to consist of members of many different unions. These
networks had different goals than the early revolutionary caucuses,
but they remained largely outside of the mainstream of the labor
movement until the mid-1990s. The formation of identity groups for
Asian Pacific Americans (APALA) and gays and lesbians (PAW),
provided further impetus for the AFL-CIO to recognize these
constituency groups. Other groups, such as AFRAM and the ATU
caucuses, although not with the same official status as the AFL-CIO's
''constituency groups," currently are mainstream entities accepted by
their unions.
The one thing that all these groups have in common is their
specific appeal to racial, gender, or other identities in addition to
unionism. Thus, any definition of identity caucuses would have to
include this as a starting point. Typically, caucuses are thought of as
subunits within a-larger body.'46 However, the membership of CBTU,
LCLAA, and other recognized AFL-CIO "constituency groups" is
comprised of many different unions. In some ways, such multi-union
constituency groups might remain above the fray of local union
politics better than internal caucuses or committees. In this way, they
can operate as a pressure point that is both external to the local union
and accepted within the labor movement.
For the purposes of this Article, I consider race and gender
''constituency groups" that take their members from many unions to
be the same as identity caucuses comprised of members from a single
union. The goals of these organizations are the same-to increase the
voice of their constituencies-regardless of whether they draw their
members from one union or several unions. Like the dissident
movements that predated the formation of CBTU and LCLAA and
other officially recognized groups, the organizations are open to
people of diverse races and genders, as long as they subscribe to the
goals of the organization. The differences between DRUM, the
League, and the Comit6 Oberero and the caucuses of today, however,
145. Interview with Subject No. 12, member of Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU)
and ATU Latino Caucus, in Chicago, 11. (Aug. 3,2001).
146. In work environments where there is no union, caucuses or "network" groups
usually exist company-wide in different locations. See Friedman, supra note 9; Helfgott,
supra note 9; Hyde, Employee Caucus, supra note 8.
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lie in the ultimate goals of the organizations, and the attitudes of
minority and female workers toward their unions, as I will describe in
Part IV. However, all such groups will be considered "identity
caucuses" for the purposes of this Article.
In summary, while the character of identity caucus activity has
changed somewhat, the basic goals of the caucuses have remained
consistent in the years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Throughout this period, the caucuses sought to change power
dynamics within their unions rather than attempting to bargain
separately with the employer. The AFL-CIO's official recognition of
identity caucuses like CBTU, CLUW, and other "constituency
groups" is a welcome sign at the highest levels, but questions remain
whether this change will filter down and affect workers of color and
women workers in local unions. There are also questions about the
effect law has on the identity caucuses taking a broader role in
traditional union functions such as bargaining, organizing, and
grievance processing. In addition, there are lingering questions about
whether the mere existence of identity caucuses is a threat to union
solidarity. I will take up these objections in Part II below.
II. The "Problem" of Multiple and Distinct Voices in Unions:
A Theoretical and Empirical Perspective
"I am a member of LCLAA, because a voice is needed for
Latinos. But I am also a member of CLUW, because I feel their
issues relate to other organizations, like LCLAA."147
The history of identity caucuses such as DRUM, the League, and
Comit6 Obrero shows that they have often been a thorn in the side of
union leadership-often engineering the ouster of the union when
they believed their constituencies were not being served. At times,
litigation has been initiated against unions by caucuses that has
attracted the attention of scholars who believe that caucuses have
served the employers' interests by dividing the workplace along race
and gender lines and enhancing the many advantages held by
employers in their struggle to keep their workplaces union-free.148
147. Survey Response from Subject No. 14, Latina member of Labor Council on Latin
American Advancement, Coalition of Labor Union Women, and United Auto Workers
(on file with author).
148. Lawsuits have been brought primarily in police and fire departments by minority
organizations over seniority practices that disadvantage nonwhites. United Black
Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1992); Bridgeport Guardians,
Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1991); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp.
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Given the turmoil that they have the potential to cause, I will now
examine the question of whether identity caucuses are ultimately
beneficial for unions and the labor movement. I conclude that
identity caucuses are necessary checks on union leadership that, in
many parts of the United States, is still predominantly comprised of
white men. Further, my research shows that identity caucuses in the
contemporary labor movement are a source of strength, rather than
division.
A. Analytical Framework: Critical Realism
In examining the frameworks in which identity caucuses operate,
I am guided by two traditions. First, legal realism sought to bring
social and empirical understandings to bear on debates of legal issues.
Legal realists greet overarching doctrinal claims with skepticism, and
seek to test how legal rules and institutions actually affect people's
lives.'49 This aversion to overarching formalist claims has led to the
modern law and society movement.'50 Law and society research is
marked by methods of empirical social science inquiry such as
interviews, surveys and participant observation.' Realism, as I use it,
is not strictly a method to arrive at an answer, but also an assessment
of the realistic possibilities for law reform in light of contemporary
1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1987). As employees of local
governments, police and fire employees are subject to state and local laws, which may or
may not incorporate the exclusive representative principle of the NLRA. Further, the
uniquely conservative nature of police and fire unions make them anomalous case studies
of identity caucuses within unions. In private sector unions, the exclusivity principle has
been used to argue against allowing caucuses to be party plaintiffs in Title VII actions
against employers and unions. See GOULD, supra note 19, at 56-58 (discussing the court's
dismissal of the Association for the Betterment of Black Edison Employees (ABBEE) as
a party plaintiff from early 1970s Detroit Edison race discrimination litigation). See also
the briefs and order regarding the motion to dismiss ABBEE in Stamps v. Detroit Edison
Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), which are available in William B. Gould IV
Collection, Box 1, Folders 9-14, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University.
149. JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995).
150. See Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society:
Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC. REV. 409
(1998); Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a New Legal
Realism, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (1998); Jonathan Simon, Law After Society, 24
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 143 (1999).
151. NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 97 ("For most legal
realists, social science was realism.") (1995); Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social
Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC. REV. 1243-65 (1994); Susan Silbey
& Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & SOC. REV.
165-174 (1987).
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realities. In the labor context, these realities include the decades-long
declining membership in labor unions and the increased willingness of
employers to use legal or extralegal means to prevent unionization. 
152
Any potential reforms should be judged in the global economic
context faced by workers and unions today."3
The second tradition, broadly speaking, is critical legal theory.
An outgrowth of legal realism and critical legal studies, Critical Race
Theory seeks to highlight the ways that law disenfranchises people of
color. Critical Race Theory is closely related to other scholarly
movements such as LatCrit Theory and Critical Race Feminism."'
Feminist theory is also a close cousin of these strands of legal thought,
sometimes grouped together as "outsider jurisprudence."'55  I will
refer broadly to these schools of thought as Critical Legal Theory.
These two traditions form the basis for this Article-the merger of
which I will call critical realism."5 I will use this lens to address the
question of whether identity caucuses should exist within unions.
Theorists of outsider jurisprudence have shown the negative
effects of suppressing race, culture, and identity, and the ways that a
lack of "consciousness" about race and gender reinforces race and
152. Kate L. Brofenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform in RESTORING THE PROMISE
OFAMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 80 (Sheldon Friedman, et al. eds., 1994) (finding that more
than 75% of employers ran anti-union campaigns that utilized both legal and illegal means
to prevent unionization).
153. KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (1997).
154. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 6 (2001); CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrienne K. Wing
ed., 1997); GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrienne K. Wing ed., 2000).
155. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice: A LatCrit
Perspective on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of 'Community' to the
Transformation of Legal Structures that Institutionalize the Depoliticization and
Fragmentation of Labor/Community Solidarity, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 773 (2001);
Francisco Vald6s, Theorizing "Out-Crit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative
Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1265 (1999). See generally THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
156. Critical realism is related to critical empiricism as identified by David Trubek.
David Trubek, Where the Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 575 (1984); see also Silbey & Sarat, supra note 151; David Trubek & John Esser,
"Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program or Pandora's Box?,
14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3 (1989). Critical realism takes the empirical aspect of realism a
step further by asking whether particular legal reforms are realistic given current political
conditions. Further, the label "empiricism" suggests a sole reliance on scientific inquiry
and observation to reach my conclusions. Legal realism utilized social science inquiry but
not to the exclusion of other perspectives. See Trubek, supra, at 586 (on the loaded
meanings of the term "empiricism").
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gender hierarchies.' They argue that refusing to permit "space" for
race and gender in the name of class solidarity is not only
counterproductive to the interests of the collective, but also
subordinates race and gender oppression to class oppression."8
Reflecting on the tensions between Black nationalist thought and
integrationism, Gary Peller wrote in 1990:
Instead of comprehending racial justice in terms of the relations of
distinct, historically defined communities, the embrace of
integrationism has signified the broad cultural attempt not to think
about race at all. Integrationists filter discussion of the wide
disparities between African-American and white communities
through the nonracial language of poverty and class.'59
Three years later, Alex Johnson critiqued the U.S. Supreme Court's
handling of litigation finding de facto discrimination against
traditionally Black colleges in Mississippi, resulting in the
traditionally Black colleges merging into the traditionally white public
colleges.IW Johnson wrote: "The assimilationist version of
integrationism, premised on traditional liberalism, presupposes a
homogenous community in which all members of society inhabit one
cultural community.' 6' However, Johnson does not conclude that
integration will not occur, only that "African-Americans should have
as much influence on whites as whites have on African-Americans"
when integration occurs.16' Given the dominance of assimilationist
messages in American society, it is likely that identity caucuses pose a
threat not to class solidarity or to union bargaining power, but instead
to the idea of a race- and gender-blind society. The reaction against
identity caucuses might also be a reaction to the increased diversity of
American society and the workforce.' Identity caucuses within
unions thus can be seen as a way to preserve race and gender
identities within assimilationist institutions.
157. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991); LESLIE G. CARR, COLOR-BLIND RACISM (1997).
158. Labor historians such as David Roediger have powerfully argued the historical
construction of class identity as "white." See ROEDIGER, supra note 35.
159. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, DUKE L.J. 758, 845 (1990).
160. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails African Americans-Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993).
161. Id. at 1452.
162. Id.
163. See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 900 (1993) (on separate institutions: "Since people of color
generally lack control over mainstream institutions, they ought to be allowed to maintain
an environment where they can function autonomously.").
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The merger of critical theory and empiricist legal realism is not
new. "Racial realism" has been recognized by critical race theorist
Derrick Bell and indeed goes back to the legal thought of Charles
Hamilton Houston and Karl Llewellyn."6 Racial realism to Bell
meant being realistic about the ability of legal structures to eradicate
racism. In addition, Bell argued: "Empiricism is a crucial aspect of
racial realism. By taking into account the abysmal statistics regarding
African Americans, their oppression is validated." '65 These scholars
have sought to shed light on the ways that formalism and legal
ideology worked to the detriment of socially subordinated people.
Critical theory thus seeks to determine how reform programs would
affect those who are "at the bottom" of racial and gender hierarchies.
As Mari Matsuda has argued, we should test potential legal reform
programs as to whether they better the situation of the worst off. If
the reforms do not meet this test, or if they make matters worse, they
should be rejected. 66
Thus, in studying the role and place of identity caucuses within
labor and employment law context, I draw scholarly traditions into
what I call critical realism. A critical realist approach (1) recognizes
that law and society are ingrained with racism and sexism; (2) seeks to
determine the goals and wishes of people of color, immigrants, and
women who must negotiate racist and sexist structures; and (3) seeks
to determine the effect of solutions to legal and political problems of
subordinated groups, and their workability in the real world. In short,
critical realism thus accepts the "critical" view of the endemic nature
of racism and sexism in society but seeks to be "realistic" about
potential legal reform programs in light of contemporary realities and
the limits of legal change.
B. Identity-Based Organizing and Its Critics
In the midst of a proliferation of identity caucuses, some
commentators question whether the caucuses are helpful or harmful
to worker solidarity in unions. To some, the race and gender
caucuses are symptomatic of the fragmentation of the working class
164. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992); see also Note, Legal
Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism About Realism on Race Relations, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (1995).
165. Bell, supra note 164, at 365 n.4.
166. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
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and the withering of the left in the last quarter century.167 Some
theorists also question whether single-issue caucuses can fully
represent workers with both race and gender identities.6
The problem with these arguments is that they privilege class
identity above all other identities. Further, they assume that the
modern labor movement has been, or could be, completely class-
centered. Some observers argue that the post-war labor movement
should return to its class-conscious beginnings.'69 However, the
success of the movement in bringing unionization to many different
occupations, ranging from screenwriters to physicians, makes it
questionable as to whether class will remain a basis for solidarity
across the labor movement.'70
The better approach is to see class as one of many identities that
workers hold, in addition to other identities, such as race and gender.
Thus, even when class is dissimilar, common bonds sometimes can be
forged on the basis of race or gender. Workers move between many
identities, depending on the situation, and workers' decisions to
become active in one caucus or another does not preclude them from
adopting other identities at appropriate times. Workers long have
split their allegiances between many different groups, and unions are
only one of them. But, the consequences of not recognizing and
suppressing the assertion of workers' identities in the name of any
other identity poses the greatest threat to solidarity. In addition,
identity caucuses represent concrete examples of the kind of multiple
consciousness which Mari Matsuda has identified.'
167. GITLIN, TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS, supra note 10; PIORE, supra note 10;
McUsic & Selmi, supra note 10; ITON, supra note 36.
168. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 10, at 1354.
[l]f identity caucuses were implemented in a workplace, it is quite possible that
an individual would be required to choose among various interests in order to
determine to which caucus she belongs .... At the same time, if identity
caucuses are treated as fluid or contingent, thus allowing individuals to move in
and out of caucuses, the concept begins to resemble the original union model
where individuals seek out commonality rather than difference.
Id.
169. Patricia Lippold & Bob Kirkman, Blocking Bridges: Class Based Politics and the
Labor Movement, in NEW LABOR MOVEMENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY 219, 221
(Gregory Mantsios ed., 1998).
170. For this reason, many have begun to see class as an identity that exists alongside
race, gender, and sexual orientation, rather than on top of these identities. See MICHAEL
ZWEIG, THE WORKING CLASS MAJORITY 132-33 (2000).
171. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); DELGADO & STEFANCIC,
supra note 154, at 55-56 (multiple consciousness "holds that most of us experience the
world in different ways because of who we are").
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The charge that identity caucuses are exclusionary is difficult to
support in light of how the caucuses actually function today. ' The
membership of most caucuses is not limited to members of an
individual identity group. Many caucuses require that its members
belong to a specific union; others require only that its members
belong to a "bona fide" union."' The requirements of union
membership can sometimes drive wedges between the union and the
unorganized, but some caucuses attempt to deal with that by creating
classes of "associate members," who do not have the privilege of
voting or running for office of their local chapters.7 4 Even without
the rigid boundaries of membership in these identity caucuses, they
provide something that their unions do not currently offer them-
otherwise, they would not invest the time nor the minimal dues that
these organizations assess.' For people of color and women in
workplaces where their numbers are small, identity caucuses provide
an opportunity, as a member of the CBTU put it, "to get together and
compare notes... [a]nd to understand we're not alone."'76
Indeed, the problem of essentialism-the notion that individuals
of similar gender or race share certain essential characteristics that
results in unanimity of thought among the group-is lessened by the
fluidity of the membership in identity caucuses. For example, the
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists has a Women's Committee that
focuses on the needs of Black women, and most identity caucuses are
liberal with regard to race and gender in their membership eligibility
guidelines.'77 Black and Latino/a identity caucuses in some
geographic areas also have a number of white members.
172. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 10, at 1356 ("By emphasizing how we are different
from one another, we create 'others' in an exclusive and divisive way.").
173. SEE ABOUT CBTU, COALITION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONISTS, at
http://www.cbtu.org/cbtuabout.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
174. LABOR COUNCIL ON LATIN AMERICAN ADVANCEMENT, NATIONAL BYLAWS
§ 2(1) (as revised Aug. 9-13, 2000), available at http://www.Iclaa.org (last visited Mar. 25,
2002).
175. Annual dues range from $15 to $25 a year in the AFL-CIO "constituency groups."
See generally Constituency Groups: A Bridge to Communities, at http://www.aflcio.org/
unionand/bridge.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
176. Rob Zaleski, Issues Spur Black Labor Coalition, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.),
Sept. 4, 2000, at 1C (quoting teacher Mike Hibbler of the Madison Metropolitan School
District).
177. See, e.g., COALITION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONISTS, MADISON, WIS. CHAPTER,
BYLAWS art. III (Oct. 14, 2000) (on file with author) (membership open to all "who
belong to a workers union or have the potential to so belong" and without regard to "race,
creed, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, political belief or religion"); see
also COALITION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONISTS (CBTU), NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND
Although some have argued that identity politics privilege the
individual over the collective, I argue that identity caucuses actually
privilege collective action over individual rights. Many so called
"identity movements" have become the bases for collective voice,
such as the civil rights and women's movements. In fact, seeing race
and gender identity through the lens of class, and vice versa, is an
exciting new development in traditional class analysis.'78 Most labor
scholars see identity caucuses as important bridges to the
communities that the labor movement needs to connect with to
remain relevant in the Twenty-First Century.9
Finally, some might ask whether identity caucuses are necessary
anymore because racism and sexism are things of the past. Unions
are like most other social institutions that have had a historical
problem with racism and sexism that continues to a lesser, and
different, extent today. But it is precisely because we expect unions
to be at the forefront of social change that they are held to a higher
standard than other social institutions. Despite gains made by the
labor movement in eradicating racism and sexism and the stated goals
of the AFL-CIO's New Voice leadership to increase diversity in the
leadership and membership ranks of organized labor, race and gender
remain potent issues in the new labor movement. Because of labor's
decreasing numbers in the private sector workforce, and the
increasing diversity of the workforce, the emerging consensus among
the labor movement is that unions must target women and people of
color as new union members to reverse unions' declining members in
the context of global economic environment of capital mobility. The
ultimate success of this campaign depends on changing entrenched
attitudes throughout the labor movement as to the proper place of
BILL OF RIGHTS art. XI (as amended May 21-26, 1997) (regarding the CBTU National
Women's Committee) (on file with author).
178. See ZWEIG, supra note 170, at 133 ("[A] working class movement that focuses only
on the injuries of class will ignore the many injuries people suffer in other aspects of their
lives."); Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767,
1825 (2001) ("While there are undeniably times when it is important to emphasize
commonality in order to build unity, suppressing differences only replicates racial, ethnic,
gender, and heterosexual privilege within the workforce.").
179. Dan Cornfield, et al., In the Community or in the Union? The Impact of
Community Involvement on Nonunion Worker Attitudes about Unionizing, in
ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 247 (Kate
Brofenbrenner, et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter ORGANIZING TO WIN]; Katherine
Sciacchitano, Finding the Community in the Union and the Union in the Community: The
First-Contract Campaign at Steeltech, in ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra at 150, 153
(discussing the role of the Milwaukee chapter of the CBTU and other community groups
in the United Electrical Workers' first contract campaign at a Milwaukee steel company).
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women and racial minorities in unions-whether as mere "numbers"
needed to achieve density or as leaders of the movement. Five years
after the New Voice leadership took office, some studies of local
unions have revealed lingering instances of institutionalized
discrimination. For example, Bill Fletcher and Richard Hurd
conducted five years of fieldwork studying about thirty large local
unions and found instances where unions remained primarily loyal to
their historic white male constituencies. '80 One of the subjects in
Fletcher and Hurd's study, an African American female union staff
member, stated that "You could characterize it as a good old boy
system .... [They] still prefer leadership that is male.... I always
need to be superior plus." 8' An African American district director of
a large union was even more damning in his comments: "Sure there's
one black here, one Asian there; they locate folk of color who can
kiss ass, follow instructions, follow proper procedure and put them in
positions that appear to be positions of authority. But the decision
loop stays the same. The labor movement is still exactly where it was
in the 40s and 50s. '182
Whether or not scholars view caucuses as beneficial to the labor
movement, the fact is that people of color and women will continue to
form caucuses and constituency groups. The relevance of the
organizations will be dependent on a number of factors. But union
attempts to suppress or disband them will serve only to drive deeper
wedges between union leadership and rank-and-file minorities.
Given the attention to race and gender issues by the new leaders of
the labor movement, and the changing demographics of the labor
force, the major threat to identity caucuses is not active suppression,
but rather the benign neglect of the labor movement and the fact that
there are several legal rules that would seem to make their existence
irrelevant. Having concluded that identity caucuses are beneficial for
the labor movement as a whole and women and people of color
specifically, I will now discuss the legal environment in which identity
caucuses function.
180. Bill Fletcher & Richard W. Hurd, Is Organizing Enough? Race, Gender and Union
Culture, 6 NEw LAB. F. 59-70 (Spring/Summer 2000) (recounting, for instance, one
African American woman's promotion from steward to business agent, which required her
to assist in the office while white male business agents were assigned to the field).
181. Fletcher & Hurd, supra note 180, at 67.
182. Id. at 68.
III. The Legal Environment for Minority Voices at Work
"Union members have many legal options if they are dissatisfied
with their union, including decertification. But the best option is to
change the leadership.
183
The legal environment in which identity caucuses function should
be examined to determine the extent to which exclusive
representation is problematic for the assertion of power by identity
caucuses within unions. Moreover, legal constraints on labor's ability
to organize workers, and workers' legal options for exit from the
union, should be examined to determine potential ramifications if the
exclusive representation system were to be ended.
The NLRA requires that the union selected by the majority of
employees at a given workplace be the exclusive bargaining agent,
also called "exclusivity." Scholars have taken issue with this rule and
argue that majority unions have disenfranchised women and people
of color and that these groups should be allowed by federal labor law
to bargain separately with their employers, perhaps through identity
caucuses or other minority representatives. '84 In order to examine the
case for the end of exclusivity, I will first examine the legal
environment for identity caucuses. In so doing, my perspective again
will be informed by a critical realist approach. Critical theorists have
examined how law has operated to the detriment of people of color,
and have also suggested ways that subordinated groups might utilize
law for social change. Proposals for legal reform, however, must be
judged in the context of whether the intended beneficiaries of the
regulation would be helped by the reform.
A. The Exclusive Representative Rule
A central feature of U.S. labor law since its inception in 1935 has
been the "exclusive representative rule." This rule is at the center of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) procedure for
organizing a union.8 ' In brief, the NLRB procedure requires the
union to obtain signed cards from employees authorizing it to bargain
for them from at least 30% of the eligible employees at the targeted
worksite, and to present those cards to the NLRB with a petition for a
183. Interview with Subject No. 7, Black male, member of Coalition of Black Trade
Unionists and American Federation of Teachers, in Madison, Wis. (Apr. 18, 2001).
184. Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7; HECKSCHER, supra note 6.
185. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2002).
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secret ballot election.86 Once the NLRB determines the cards are
valid, and deals with any questions relating to the appropriateness of
the unit in a representation hearing, an election date will be set. If
the union wins the support of the majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit, the NLRB will certify the union as the
"exclusive bargaining agent" of the entire unit pursuant to NLRA
section 9(a), requiring the employer to bargain in "good faith" with
the representative pursuant NLRA section 8(a)(5). Section 9(a)
states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive bargaining of all
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer and have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative,
as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given
the opportunity to be present at such adjustment.'87
Exclusivity was a basis for the Supreme Court's 1944 holding that
"direct dealing" or individual contracts between employees and their
employers were illegal if meant to undermine the union certified asexluiv brginng• 188 ti
exclusive bargaining representative. In this way, the law protects
against the employer dividing the loyalties of the unit and
186. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (emphasis added). A union may bypass the NLRB
procedure, provided the employer voluntarily recognizes the union upon a showing that it
represents a majority of the workers in the proposed bargaining unit. Because of the
cumbersome nature of the NLRB processes, campaigns pursuing voluntary recognition
are becoming increasingly frequent. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union
Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
42 (2001) (finding an increasing number of unions organizing outside the NLRB election
process).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). I will refer to both of the provisos to section 9(a) collectively as
"the proviso to section 9(a)," as the Supreme Court did in Emporium Capwell. See infra
Part IIIB.
188. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). It is important to note, however, that
J.L Case Co. does not prohibit individual negotiations in all situations, especially when the
Union allows it. "[W]here there is great variation in the circumstances of employment or
the capacity of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only
minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to individual
bargaining." Id. at 338. Dealing directly with a represented employee, however, without
the union's consent, is a violation of the duty to bargain. See Medo Photo Supply Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
undermining the union by negotiating better deals with some
employees than others. Section 9(a), and other sections of the Act
that deal with the union's presumption of majority status and when
petitions by rival unions can be acted upon by the Board, also
guarantee the union some stability against competitors, whether they
be minority caucuses or other unions.'89
Several commentators have questioned whether exclusivity is in
the best interest of the labor movement, in that it focuses too much
attention on winning workplace majorities, and that it results in a
membership that is unevenly committed to the goals of the union that
is ultimately elected by a majority of the bargaining unit9 The
United States is one of the few countries to adopt exclusivity as its
organizing principle of industrial relations. 9' European countries rely
less on majority rule and a union representing a minority of the
workforce can compel an employer to bargain.'92 Some scholars
believe that members-only bargaining is allowed by the present
regime, even if the union does not represent a majority at the
workplace. Others argue that recognition and bargaining with a
minority union might be an unfair labor practice in itself. The few
studies of minority bargaining are inconclusive either in showing its
189. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) provides for an absolute bar against any election for one year
after a valid election has been held: "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit
or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held." Further, the NLRB will entertain a decertification petition in a
bargaining unit only (1) once every three years; (2) if supported by at least 30% of the
employees in the unit; and (3) if filed within a limited "window" period no earlier than
ninety days and no later than sixty days before contract expiration. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e).
190. See authorities cited supra note 6.
191. For a more detailed comparative analysis of nonexclusive bargaining, see Clyde W.
Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a "Unique" American
Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47 (1998) (although many European countries
mandate unions or works councils at firms, individuals are free to make and enforce
individual contracts concerning the terms of their employment).
192. Race caucuses also exist in European countries. For example, Satnam Virdee and
Keith Grint studied a Black caucus in the British National and Local Government Officers
union. Separate bargaining was not the goal of that caucus. As one member of the caucus
put it:
It is not self-organization for the sake of being separate. It is to ensure exactly
the opposite-that black issues and rights are addressed by the trade unions [to]
which we belong in a way acceptable to black members. As black trade unionists
we believe in the principles of solidarity and support but these can never happen
if they work only for some.
Satnam Virdee & Keith Grint, Black Self-Organization in Trade Unions, 42 Soc. REV.
203, 209-10 (1994).
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effectiveness for its members or the sustainability of a legal challenge
to the practice.
As I will argue in more detail below, the effectiveness of
members-only, identity based bargaining units for women and people
of color must be viewed from several perspectives, including the
willingness of women and people of color to participate in such
organizations. First, however, I will examine the legal dimensions of
the exclusive representative rule.
B. Emporium Capwell and Its Implications for Identity Caucuses
The central Supreme Court decision relating to the bargaining
power of identity caucuses actually did not involve a caucus at all, but
it has implications for the legal context in which identity caucuses
operate. In Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community
Organization94, the Court set the parameters of the "exclusive
representative" rule, and what constitutes a "demand for bargaining"
with the employer outside of the union's duty and right to bargain
with the employer as a certified representative. The union in
Emporium Capwell represented employees of the department store
chain in San Francisco.' 9' Several Black employees had grown
dissatisfied with the pace of promotions and hiring for Black
employees.'" On April 3, 1968, they presented a list of grievances to
the union, which included the Company's alleged race discrimination
as their chief concern."9 Union officials reported to the company that
193. On "members-only bargaining," see Wade Rathke, Letting More Flowers Bloom
Under the Setting Sun, in WHICH DIRECTION FOR ORGANIZED LABOR? ESSAYS ON
ORGANIZING, OUTREACH, AND INTERNAL TRANSFORMATIONS 75 (Bruce Nissen ed.,
1999); Bruce Nissen, "Building a Minority Union": The CWA Experience at NCR, 25 LAB.
STUD. J. 36 (2001) (arguing that a members-only contract might be illegal as a violation of
NLRA section 8(a)(2) as discrimination on the basis of union status); Clyde Summers,
Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 548 (1992) (arguing
that NLRA section 8(a)(3) prohibits only discrimination against workers for union
membership, not more favorable treatment which may be obtained under a "members-
only" contract). This Article does not address the arguments for or against minority
unionism, because, as scholars have argued, the labor movement could commit itself to
organizing minority unions in addition to majority exclusive representatives under the
current legal regime. See Alan Hyde, Frank Sheed, & Mary Decry Uva, After Smyrna:
Rights and Powers of Unions that Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
637 (1993). However, the fact that unions have not put much energy into organizing
minority unions thus far does not indicate that a change in the legal regime would
significantly increase union density.
194. 420 U.S. 50, 53 (1975).
195. Id. at 52-53.
196. Id. at 53.
197. Id.
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there was a "possibility of racial discrimination" and that "explosive"
events could occur if action was not taken.' The Company promised
to "look into the matter."' 9  The union called a meeting with
Company officials, the California Fair Employment Practices
Commission, and a local anti-poverty agency.
After investigation, the union concluded that the Company was
discriminating and told the employees that it would process each
grievance over race discrimination to arbitration, if necessary." The
problem was that the employees did not believe that individual
grievance arbitrations were sufficient to deal with the systemic nature
of the discrimination, and refused to participate in any of the
grievance proceedings. The employees instead sought a meeting with
the Company president, who, in the ordinary course of affairs, was
not involved in the bargaining for this unit. When this meeting was
refused, they initiated a leafleting and community boycott campaign
with the help of San Francisco's Western Addition Community
Organization. A group of employees also held a press conference,
carried on local TV and radio, where they denounced the Company's
policies as racist and expressed a desire to meet with "the top
management" of the Company to discuss minority employment
conditions."1  Two Black employees, Tom Hollins and Joseph
Hawkins, received written warnings for this conduct, threatening
discharge if the activities continued."2 The employees continued their
leafleting of the store, and were ultimately terminated. 3
With the help of Western Addition Community Organization,
Hollins and Hawkins filed charges with the National Labor Relations
Board, alleging that their terminations violated section 7 of the
NLRA.2°" Under section 7, employees cannot be terminated for
engaging in "concerted activities," unless they are violent, disloyal, or
not related to wages, hours, and working conditions.0 The charges
became a complaint that was rejected by an NLRB Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found as a factual matter that the
employees were engaged in separate bargaining, and that such
198. Id. at 53-54.
199. Id. at 54.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 55.
202. Id. at 56.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 57.
205. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9,17 (1962); NLRB v. Local
1299, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 473-75 (1953); New River Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (4th Cir. 1991).
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activity was in derogation of the rule of exclusive representation, and
thus would not be protected by section 7.2o6 The NLRB in
Washington, D.C., upheld the ALJ's decision. 7 The employees then
appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which reversed the Board.28 The court
proposed a new standard that asks whether the union is most
effectively remedying the alleged discrimination, and if not, whether
the employees' actions were "so disloyal to their employer as to
deprive them of Section 7 protections... ,209 The D.C. Circuit held
that the employees' actions were protected concerted activities.
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in an opinion
authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall. The Court held that the
employees' conduct was protected neither by section 7 of the NLRA
nor by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), because the
employees' actions conflicted with the exclusive representation
principle embodied in section 9(a) of the NLRA. The Court held that
the proviso to NLRA section 9(a), which by its terms seems to
authorize adjustment of grievances without the union's intervention,
would not protect the employees from discipline, because it was
intended to protect the employer from unfair labor practice charges
for dealing directly with the employees. It did not give the employees
any protection from discipline for attempting to adjust grievances
with the employer without the intervention of the union.2'
The Court in Emporium Capwell paid insufficient attention to
the direct applicability of the proviso to section 9(a) to the facts of the
case, which has been pointed out by several commentators. "' The
crux of the dispute in Emporium Capiwell dealt with the "presentation
of grievances" to the employer by a group of employees outside of
the union, which is within the ambit of section 9(a). The only
remaining question was whether the presentation of a "group
grievance" relating to discrimination against Black employees would
have contravened the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
206. The Emporium & W. Addition Cmty. Org., 192 N.L.R.B. 173 (1971).
207. Two Board members dissented from this holding. Member Jenkins concluded that
because the conduct dealt with working conditions within the purview of section 7, the
employees were illegally discharged. Member Brown agreed, but also disputed the ALJ's
factual finding that the employees were "bargaining" rather than simply urging the
Company to take action about important workplace issues. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B.
at 173-77.
208. Western Addition Cmty. Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd,
Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
209. Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 60.
210. Id. at 61 n.12.
211. Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7; Iglesias, supra note 7, at 416-17 n.66.
between the union and the Company. But the Court never reached
the question of whether a group grievance would have been allowed
under the contract. Instead, it dispatched the proviso in a footnote by
pointing out that it did not grant a right to bargain the way that
section 8(a)(5) did: "The intendment of the proviso is to permit
employees to present grievances and to authorize the employer to
entertain them without opening itself to liability for dealing directly
with employees in derogation of the duty to bargain only with the
exclusive bargaining representative, a violation of Section 8(a)(5)."2 2
Instead of analyzing whether the employees' actions were protected
by the proviso, the Court decided whether the exclusive
representative rule must yield to Title VII in cases dealing with race
discrimination.
When cast as a battle between the NLRA's and Title VII's
objectives, Emporium Capwell is a classic example of the workforce
being divided along class and race lines.2 4 However, the Court too
broadly defined what the employees wanted as "bargaining" with the
employer, and paid insufficient attention to the proviso to section
9(a) as a legitimate avenue that they could have pursued. The union
made no claim that what the employees wanted, essentially a group
grievance, would violate the collective bargaining agreement. In fact,
the union agreed that the Company was discriminating and filed a
grievance according to the collective bargaining agreement.
However, the dissidents believed the grievance procedure was
inadequate to address their concerns.
Emporium Capwell has become the leading symbol of the legal
rule governing "dissident activity" within unions. However, it has
also become a symbol of how labor unions have interacted with
community groups, often to the detriment of the movement itself.
When community groups have sought to involve themselves in
212. Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 61 n.12.
213. Id. at 52.
214. The tension between Title VII and the NLRA was also identified by Justice
Douglas in his dissent in Emporium Capwell, where he stated: "[I]n the area of racial
discrimination the Union is hardly in a position to demand exclusive control, for the
employee's right to nondiscriminatory treatment does not depend upon Union demand
but is based on the law." Id. at 75. This tension promises to be important in the future.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service, 525 U.S. 70
(1998), did not resolve the question of whether a union can ever waive an employee's Title
VII rights with a clear and unmistakable waiver in a collective bargaining agreement, but
at least one circuit has answered that question affirmatively. See Safrit v. Cone Mills
Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001) (waiver of union member's right to bring a Title
VII claim was accomplished by "clear and unmistakable" waiver in collective bargaining
agreement), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 464 (2001).
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unions, they have found an ideology that is partly driven by law but
partly rooted in notions of hierarchy and the legal entitlement to
exclusively speak for workers. These attitudes are beginning to
change, however, and many see the new identity caucuses and
constituency groups as a way to change the labor movement's
211reputation with community groups.
Emporium Capiwell seems to have had a profound impact on
what it means for informal groups of employees in the union to
"bargain" with the employer. The proviso to section 9(a) is rarely
invoked since its evisceration in Emporium Capwell. Theorists of
legal consciousness might conclude that the lack of attempts to
bargain means that Emporium Capwell served to snuff out union
groups by embedding exclusivity in the collective consciousness.216
For several reasons that I will describe further below, Emporium
Capwell should not be seen as the reason for the lack of attempts at
separate bargaining. The first reason for this lies in Emporium
Capwell itself. The Black employees, Hollins and Hawkins, were not
disciplined for requesting to bargain with the employer; rather, they
were disciplined for leafleting and media activities which labeled their
employers as racists.217 It is unlikely that the mere request to bargain
separately with the employer would have led to discipline unless
associated with some other activity deemed "disloyal." On its facts,
215. See Chen & Wong, supra note 127.
Constituency groups within the AFL-CIO, who have long served as a voice for
people of color and women, are strategic bridges between labor unions and
neglected communities. To serve this function well, constituency groups must be
self-critical, and must transform their practices to support and embrace an
organizing culture and the new spirit of change within labor.
Id. at 201.
216. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS 5 (1990).
The ways people understand and use law I term their legal consciousness.
Consciousness, as I am using the term, is the way people conceive of the
"natural" and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and
action, and their commonsense understanding of the world. The consciousness I
am describing is not only the realm of deliberate, intentional action but also that
of habitual action and practice.
Id.
217. The handbill asking for a community boycott read in part:
The Emporium is a 20th Century colonial plantation. The brothers and sisters
are being treated the same way as our brothers are being treated in the slave
mines of Africa.
Whenever the racist pig at the Emporium injures or harms a black sister or
brother, they injure and insult all black people. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY
FOR THESE INSULTS.
Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 55 n.2.
then, Emporium Capwell does not present a substantial barrier to
demands for bargaining among any group of employees, but of
course, the employer has no legal duty to respond to the demand.
If Emporium Capwell is not a major hindrance to groups of
employees bringing grievances to their employer outside of the
majority union, then one might ask why more internal union groups
have not pursued bargaining with their employers, or at least sought
to communicate their grievances directly to the employer in more
instances. One might point to the end of organized rank-and-file
minority protest in the early 1970s as roughly coextensive with the
Emporium Capwell decision in 1975. Scholars who study law's effect
on people's behavior might conclude that Emporium Capwell
effectively sent the message that the union was the sole avenue for
bargaining with the employer, and any other attempts to
communicate with the employer would lead to discipline.
However, as I will show below in Part IV, a more likely
explanation for union members' choice to work within the union's
established channels has to do with their desire to work out matters
within the union, rather than through legal regimes. In fact, it seems
that workers of color and women in unions have assimilated an idea
of majority rule that goes beyond legal regimes, but which appears to
have its root in the democratic principles embedded in society at
large. In other words, providing greater voice for workers of color
and women in the unions may have less to do with the principle of
exclusivity, i.e., the legal rules that define the interactions of workers
with their employer, but instead "majority rule"-the intraunion
democratic governance structures that come from embedded notions
of democracy in our society.
C. Envisioning Broad Use of the Proviso to NLRA Section 9(a)
The proviso to section 9(a), though eviscerated in Emporium
Capwell, would seem to give dissident union members the ability to
be heard, and have their grievances adjusted, as long as the union was
present and any resolution was not in conflict with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. The language of the proviso would
seem to protect the rights of employees from discipline for seeking a
meeting with the employer, provided the other conditions are met.
Indeed, the employees in Emporium Capwell were not disciplined for
seeking a separate meeting with the employer, but instead for the
unauthorized picketing in which they participated. The question then
is whether the proviso alone is adequate to enhance minority voice in
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the workplace, and whether or not it should be amended to explicitly
take into account Emporium Capwell.
As Justice Marshall stated in his opinion in Emporium Capwell,
the proviso does not confer a "right" on employees to present
grievances to the employer "by making it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to entertain such a presentation, nor can it be
read to authorize a resort to economic coercion. 2 18 The question
then is whether the employer should be required to listen, and who
decides whether or not the resolution is consistent with the collective
agreement.
The tension that Justice Marshall pointed to between
individualized justice and collective action should not be
underestimated.219 The proviso potentially gives the employees the
incentive to rally others to their cause, and parallels the law of section
7, which protects "concerted activity" with regard to wages, hours,
and working conditions, but only if the employee engages in the
protected activity with at least one other employee. Ideally, the
union would be backing the employees' demands without need for
resort to the proviso. If that is not the case, however, what if a
subgroup of employees not in the majority backed the employees'
demands? Here is where identity caucuses might play a role. The
prospect of an identity caucus seeking resolution to the problem may
be more troubling for the union and the employer because it changes
the interaction from a "few disaffected employees" to a struggle
between the union leadership and "factions" in the union. However,
if some accommodation between exclusivity and minority rights is to
be worked out, voices within the union should be heard.
My research suggests that most identity caucuses do not have
much interest in seeking "proviso" meetings with their employers if
they feel that their unions are not serving their needs.220 The stamp of
approval of a caucus should not be necessary, though, and employees
218. Id. at 61 n.12.
219. Citing legislative history, Justice Marshall pointed out: "The intendment of the
proviso is to permit employees to present grievances and to authorize the employer to
entertain them without opening itself to liability for dealing directly with employees in
derogation of the duty to bargain only with the exclusive representative, a violation of
Section 8(a)(5)." Id. While it is the case that the main purpose of the proviso was to
protect employers from liability, it does not necessarily follow that the employees can face
discipline for attempting to utilize the proviso, especially in light of section 7's protection
of "concerted activity." However, this should be made explicit by the statute, and would
probably also necessitate an amendment to section 8(a), adding "refusal to entertain a
meeting under the proviso to Section 9(a)" to the list of employer unfair labor practices.
220. See infra Part IV.
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should be allowed to petition their employer in whatever
configurations that they deem best. At a minimum, the proviso
grants the employer and the union the ability to agree to a grievance
procedure that gives employees the right to bring individual
grievances.22' Identity caucuses could argue for a formal role in the
contractual grievance process as well. Practically, however, few
unions or employers are willing to recognize multiple grievance
representatives. However, identity caucuses might still be able to
utilize the proviso as written when they believe it is necessary.
Would greater use of the proviso lead to discord and division,
thereby increasing the already large advantage that employers have in
their dealings with unions? This is a significant concern, and one that
all labor supporters should give serious attention. These same
concerns should attend any move to repeal the exclusive
representative rule to improve the voice of people of color within
unions, since such good intentions often are co-opted by those who
would prefer to destroy the labor movement.222 However, the
revitalization of the proviso would simply reaffirm the right of
employees to communicate grievances to their employers, once the
contractual process with the union has been exhausted, and simply
require the employers to listen." First, the union, upon notice that its
members are dissatisfied with the contractual process, would have an
incentive to prevent the employees from going to the employer
because of its desire to show unity before the employer. This is a
strong incentive that will resolve most problems before they ever
reach the employer.
Further, the proviso as written gives employees "the right.., to
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
221. See Black-Clawson Co. v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists Lodge 355, Dist. 137, 313 F.2d
179 (2d Cir. 1962) (the collective bargaining agreement must provide employees the right
to bring grievances individually, otherwise the employer entertaining an individual
grievance would contravene the proviso's requirement that the grievance adjustment be
consistent with the collective agreement).
222. See, for example, The Institute for Justice's work to repeal prevailing wage
statutes and the National Right to Work Foundation's desire to protect dissenters within
their unions.
223. Exhaustion of internal union procedures is generally required in grievance
processing. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) ("As a general
rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual
employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance
procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.") (citation
omitted).
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agreement then in effect .. .,,22 Thus, the union will also wish to
prevent disputes with the employer and its members over whether the
adjustment of the grievances is consistent or not with the collective
bargaining agreement. In sum, the threat that groups of employees
will go to management to make a separate agreement that may in fact
be inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement should be
enough of a threat to the union's "united front" that the union will do
what it can to resolve the matter before a "proviso meeting" occurs.
Most unions adhere to best practices as a matter of principle and
service to their members, but not all unions are consistent in their
practices.
If the proviso is such a weapon, then why have groups of
employees used litigation, decertification, and wildcat strike remedies
instead of the proviso? The answer may be the extent to which
knowledge about the proviso is disseminated, which is related to the
Supreme Court's dismissive attitude towards the proviso in
Emporium Capiwell. Certainly, many union members have engaged
in litigation, decertification of their union, and wildcat strikes when
they felt their needs were not being met. However, as shown by my
survey research in Part IV below, the "united front" ideology is well
disseminated, and it is not clear that a change to the legal rules would
increase the desire of union members to bargain separately with their
employers.
D. Exit, Voice, and Exclusivity
Before discussing my empirical research suggesting that members
of identity caucuses do not find exclusive union representation
problematic, I will first explain why changes in exclusivity are not in
the interests of women, people of color, or the labor movement.
Several scholars criticize exclusivity as counterproductive to the
fortunes of the labor movement.25 With exclusivity comes the legal
224. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1998).
225. Finkin, supra note 6; Summers, supra note 6. James Gray Pope and others voice a
middle position of "deliberative reflection" on exclusivity. James Pope, Peter Kellman &
Ed Bruno, Toward a New Labor Rights Movement, 4 WORKINGUSA 8, 26 (2001) (calling
for a deliberative discussion about the utility of the American rule of exclusive
representation, given that other countries without it have higher union density: "[Tihe
fact that the overwhelming majority of industrialized countries reject exclusive
representation should give us pause. At a minimum, we should reassess our commitment
to the principle, and consider possible alternatives and modifications that might better
serve labor freedom."); see also STANLEY ARONOWITZ, FROM THE ASHES OF THE OLD:
AMERICAN LABOR AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 222, 226 (1998) (calling for more debate
duty to represent all employees in the union's bargaining unit fairly,
whether or not the employees support the union or not. Without
exclusivity, unions would be freed from defending duty of fair
representation litigation, since the duty of fair representation unions
owe to their members was created because of the union's power as
exclusive bargaining representative. The need for the union to
obtain majority support in given bargaining units would also
disappear if the unions did not seek to be the exclusive bargaining
representative for the unit. Unions could focus on only those
members who choose to be represented by them. Alan Hyde and
others have written about how unions that command less than a
majority can still be effective employee representatives. 27
Other scholars, such as Marion Crain, point to exclusivity as a
barrier to the assertion of the voices of people of color and women in
the labor movement.2 These scholars argue for the repeal of
exclusivity in order for people of color to have their own bargaining
representatives with management. The doctrines of exclusivity and
majority rule, they argue, inhibit people of color from having the
voice that unions are supposed to guarantee. According to Crain, a
better system would allow workers of color and women workers to
bargain separately with their employer through representatives who
better understand their issues. Crain has suggested that the legal
framework should be changed so that constituency groups such as the
CBTU and CLUW, as well as community groups, might serve in
representative capacities on behalf of workers of color and women. 29
Replacing traditional unions with identity caucus members as
representatives has some advantages. First, these workers, as fellow
trade unionists, are well situated to know how collective bargaining
works. Many of them, as leaders in their unions, already have a good
deal of bargaining experience. Finally, by their membership in
identity caucuses, these workers betray a sense that race and gender
matter in the workplace. As shown by the historical and
around proposals that would cancel bargaining as the exclusive right of unions, such as a
replication of the works councils model in Europe).
226. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (finding the duty of
fair representation implicit in the Railway Labor Act's exclusivity principle); Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (finding the duty implicit in section 9(a) of the
NLRA).
227. Hyde, Sheed, & Uva, supra note 193.
228. Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7.
229. Id. at 1617 (citing to organizations listed in the Resource Directory in ARTHUR B.
SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM (1991), including APRI, CBTU, LCLAA, CLUW and the
North Carolina-based Black Workers for Justice).
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contemporary context, however, these groups have shown little
interest in usurping the role of the union as exclusive bargaining
representative. There is also reason to question whether such groups
have the institutional capacity to function in such a role. In many
cases, their members are already serving in leadership capacities in
their unions, and dealing with work and family responsibilities. Thus,
the practical limitations of identity caucus bargaining seem to
outweigh the benefits.
There are other reasons why exclusivity should not be ended
with respect to women and people of color. A.O. Hirschman's classic
work Exit, Voice, and Loyalty provides a good example. Hirschman
studied the conditions under which customers of a business or
members of an organization, among other social institutions, would
choose to exit the organization, or use voice to change the institution.
Among other factors, Hirschman found that loyalty to the firm or
institution was an often ignored, but important, factor in the
calculation. Hirschman concluded that a no-exit organization will be
superior to a system with some limited exit options on two conditions:
"(1) if exit is ineffective as a recuperation mechanism but does
succeed in draining from the firm or organization its more quality-
conscious, alert and potentially activist customers or members; and
(2) if voice can be made into an effective mechanism once these
members are locked in.""23 " Thus, increasing voice, rather than
allowing freer exit, is preferable for most institutions.
Hirschman concluded that because of the cumbersome legal
process involved in decertifying unions, dissatisfied workers are
"much more likely to make an effort at revitalizing the union with
which they are affiliated., 231 There are few exit options available to
union members in most states-if members refuse to pay dues to the
union, they can be fired. However, the exit option of decertification
is available in all states and can be quite damaging to the union and
the employees-since it often means that the union will not be
replaced with another one but instead that there will be no union at
all.232 Decertification is not the only exit option, however. In the
230. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 16, at 55.
231. Id. at 80.
232. This is due partly to rules that prevent affiliates of the AFL-CIO from raiding
other affiliated unions. AFL-CIO CONST., supra note 30, art. 20, § 2: "No affiliate shall
organize or attempt to represent employees as to whom an established collective
bargaining relationship exists with any other affiliate." Of course, the AFL-CIO
Constitution applies only to those unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO, but currently the
vast majority of existing unions are so affiliated. The only two notable exceptions are the
"right-to-work" states found mostly in the southern United States,
workers can refuse to pay any dues to the certified exclusive
representative."' The relative weakness of unions in the South, then,
suggests that a nonexclusive bargaining regime would significantly
weaken union bargaining strength overall. Further, members can
resign their membership at any time, losing all participatory rights in
the union's democracy but also immunizing them from union
discipline.234
A further question is whether given the choice of exit or voice,
women and people of color prefer first to utilize exit or voice to deal
with problems with their employers and their unions. Besides the
difficulties generally inherent in exit, Hirschman emphasized that
loyalty must be taken into account in the exit-voice calculation.235
"Loyalty" in the union context might mean more than loyalty to one's
union, but also loyalty to the ideals of the union movement, as I will
discuss further in Part IV. Such loyalty might transcend any
calculation about the ramifications-legal or otherwise-of choosing
exit or voice. In general, stronger loyalty will result in preferring
voice to exit.
There are other reasons for enhancing voice rather than
facilitating exit options that have to do with the legal environment for
exit. The willingness of employers to break or exploit the weaknesses
of labor law also has been shown by many studies.236 The desire to
thwart unionization by their employees will also lead employers to
use race or gender differences as a wedge issue. The weakness of the
current law on bargaining is also a reason to ask why separate
United Electrical Workers (UE) and the National Education Association (NEA). About
thirteen million of the nation's 16.3 million unionized workers are in AFL-CIO affiliated
unions. Pam Ginsbach, BLS Reports Union Membership Unchanged at 16.3 Million, 13
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 18, 2002, at AA-1. An end to exclusive representation
would have little effect on the AFL-CIO's domination of the "market" for
representational services.
233. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1998): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
234. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
235. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 16, at 33-34; see also Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power
and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1283, 1289-90 (1992) (in the context of sexual harassment, structural barriers and loyalty
to the firm often make exit difficult or undesirable).
236. See Brofenbrenner, supra note 152; Richard B. Freeman & Morris Kleiner,
Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
351-65 (1990); Morris Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the
Decline of Unionism in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519 (2001).
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bargaining would be an overall benefit to female and union members
of color.237 Many unions have found that the employer's duty to
bargain is a hollow one if the employer pushes its duty to bargain to
its legal (and sometimes extralegal) limits. The distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining has also hampered
the ability of unions to determine which issues are worth striking
over.2" Even when it finds a violation of the NLRA, the NLRB's
effectiveness in providing immediate relief has been questioned.
Thus, the law of bargaining is yet another area where many in the
labor movement have called for labor law reform.2 9  A realistic
perspective leads to the prediction that wholesale labor law reform is
unlikely in the near future. The Bush Administration certainly has no
interest in labor law reform, and even under President Clinton no
large-scale effort was mounted to level the legal playing field between
unions and employers. Thus, it is unclear that providing women and
people of color the right to bargain separately from the union would
accomplish much without wholesale changes to the law of bargaining.
E. Exclusivity and Labor's Civil Rights Agenda
A critical theory examination of the legal history of the labor and
civil rights movements also suggests that the interests of people of
color and women would not be served by the repeal of exclusivity.
The history of discrimination practiced by labor unions is well-
documented, but discrimination and segregation was most virulent in
the days before the National Labor Relations Act governed labor
relations. Before 1935, unions segregated into white and nonwhite
locals. The number of segregated locals decreased after 1935
because, for the first time, unions could claim to represent all workers
in a given bargaining unit of the employer, whether or not the
employees were members of the union. However, segregated locals
were not made illegal until the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act in 1964. Prior to that law, unions could choose to organize their
237. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employer need
not bargain with the union over the decision to close part of its business); H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970) (courts cannot compel the acceptance of specific bargaining
demands by one side or another); NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952)
(employer can refuse to bargain over matters which are "management functions" even if
they touch on conditions of employment).
238. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 39-40 (1993) (arguing for the end of the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining).
239. WILLIAM B. GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 171-73 (1993).
locals in any way they chose.24 The doctrine on the Board's
certification of segregated bargaining units moved back and forth
from 1935 until 1964, when the Board finally adopted a per se rule
against certification of segregated bargaining units. The union's
obligation to fairly represent nonwhite and female employees in its
bargaining unit led to eventual acceptance of nonwhites and women.
Ending the duty to represent all members of the bargaining unit
would also reduce the union's incentive to serve women and people
of color who choose to stay in the bargaining unit.242 The labor
movement's willingness to advocate for civil rights causes would be
decreased, and these movements would suffer. One might ask why
the union movement has been so recently interested in the issues of
women, people of color, and immigrants, and the answer lies in the
decreasing share of the labor market that unions represent. Unions
will be more likely to advocate on behalf of people of color and
women if the potential exists for some increase to their
membership. 43
Although discussion of the effect of ending exclusivity usually
focuses on the inconvenience to the employer or the reduced
economic power of the bargaining unit, there are other reasons that
go to labor's power as a movement and its willingness to take up civil
rights causes that should not be overlooked. Many labor scholars
believe that unions must take a "social movement" orientation to
survive in the new century." The end of exclusivity and labor's need
240. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994).
241. Michael Jordan, The NLRB Racial Discrimination Decisions, 1935-1964: The
Empiric Process of Administration and the Inner Eye of Racism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 55
(1991).
242. Duty of fair representation (DFR) litigation has not been a panacea for plaintiffs,
whether they are white, nonwhite, male or female. This is for a variety of reasons,
including lack of access to competent attorneys, a short statute of limitations (six months),
and a high standard of proof. Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation:
What the Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89 (1985) (examining the low success rates
of DFR plaintiffs). However, the mere threat of such litigation sometimes provides a
limited incentive for unions to fairly conduct grievance procedures.
243. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Constructing Solidarity: Interest and White Workers,
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 747, 760 (2000) ("Racial and ethnic minorities and women of
all races need to find or forge solidaristic ties with each other to pursue shared interests, as
well as needing at times to work with white men.").
244. Lowell Turner & Richard W. Hurd, Building Social Movement Unionism: The
Transformation of the American Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT:
LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9, 11 (Lowell
Turner et al. eds., 2001) (social movement unionism is characterized by greater rank-and-
file participation than business unionism, where leaders make deals with management with
little input from membership).
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to broaden its appeal and interest to a greater number of people will
lead it to narrowly define its interests. This narrowing of interests
likely will lead to a return to the "craft unionism" of the AFL, rather
than the broad "wall to wall" organizing strategy of the CIO. The
negative history of the AFL compared to the CIO on race and gender
issues suggests that the interests of women and people of color would
be harmed if exclusive representation were ended.
Further, there is some historical precedent for labor unions'
unwillingness to organize in what they deem to be adverse legal
environments. The solidly "right to work" southern United States is
one geographic area that has a modified form of "members-only"
unionism-that is, workers who are in the union's bargaining unit, but
are not required to pay dues to the union.245 Historically, the labor
movement has not placed a high priority on organizing the South,
usually citing the right-to-work legal environment as the major
obstacle. The replication of a "right to work" model on a nationwide
scale would result in union leadership committing only to organizing
those who they believe to be most willing to be in a union. In the
past, assumptions about who is most "organizable" have contributed
to a historic unwillingness by unions to organize women, people of
color, and immigrants.246
In summary, a critical realist perspective shows that proposals to
change the legal structure of the bargaining relationship between
employers and unions are not necessary, and indeed may be
counterproductive to the interests of people of color and women in
unions. Indeed, commentators suggest that the key to the labor
movement's greater sensitivity to matters of race and gender, as well
as sexual orientation, is more organizing.247 Changes to legal rules
that remove incentives to wide-scale organizing are likely to lead to
union complacency about the necessity of organizing and a return to
the business unionism that historically has excluded women and
people of color. Instead, the internal workings of unions and the law
governing union democracy should be examined to deal with issues of
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1998).
246. See HECTOR DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD UNIONS (1993) (refuting
assumptions about immigrants' desire to organize unions); Marion Crain, Gender and
Union Organizing, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 227 (1994) (refuting the thesis that
women are "unorganizable"); Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Participation in
Local Unions: A Comparison of Black and White Members, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
323 (1987) (contradicting previous studies that Blacks participate in unions less than
whites).
247. Fletcher & Hurd, supra note 180, at 61 (advocating "organizing for inclusion,"
which explicitly confronts issues of race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual identity).
race and gender in a way that does not undermine the interests of the
bargaining unit and the interests of women and people of color. As
an alternative to ending exclusivity, Dorothy Sue Cobble has argued
for the creation of "intraunion bargaining structures" to facilitate
participation and to better protect the rights of minorities .1 8  "In
contrast to the repeal of the exclusivity doctrine, the promotion of
such formalized intraunion bargaining structures would ensure that
the class needs of employees are met along with the needs that flow
from their different racial, ethnic, and gender identities. 2 41 I will now
address identity caucuses as a kind of "intraunion bargaining
structure" being utilized today in the unions where exclusivity is the
legal norm.
IV. How Power Is Being Voiced at Work Today
Lack of numbers in our union caucus has inhibited us from having
influence with the union leadership and subsequently the
negotiation process with the local and international. So the only
way to change that is to have more numbers in our rank and file
caucuses so they will take us seriously." °
A. A Realistic View of Worker Power in the Contemporary Context
As I have argued above, my approach includes ascertaining the
extent to which workers might prefer identity caucuses as their
bargaining representatives to traditional unions. In addition, the
realist perspective looks at available evidence about social conditions
to determine whether people of color and women would benefit from
a change to the exclusive representative rule. These questions are
particularly critical now that union density currently hovers around
10% of the private sector.25' At the same time, the race, gender, and
248. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Making Postindustrial Unionism Possible, in RESTORING
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 285, 302 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
As an example of an "intraunion bargaining structure," Cobble points to her earlier work
examining gender issues in waitress locals where gender representation on joint boards or
councils was "often some combination of interest and proportion, not unlike the
representation system operating in the U.S. House (proportional) and the Senate
(interest)." Id. (citing DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND
THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 184-87 (1991)).
249. Id. at 302.
250. Interview with Subject No. 10, Black male member of the United Auto Workers
and the Black Rank and File Exchange, in Detroit, Mich. (July 13, 2001).
251. See AFL-CIO Focuses on Improving Organizing As Numbers Continued Declining
in 2000, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 16, 2001, at AA-3. See also Ginsbach, supra note
232.
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national origin diversity of the workforce has continued to grow.
Studies have shown that people of color have a stronger preference
than whites for unions. In their study, What Workers Want, Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers found that most workers, and especially
African American workers, had a strong preference for some form of
employee representation in the workplace.252 Other studies have
found that immigrants, particularly those from Latin America, have a
stronger preference for unions than native-born workers.253 These
studies suggest that unions, as they exist today, are still popular
institutions with women and people of color.
Thus, it is unclear what would be accomplished by giving women
and people of color the right to bargain separately in race and gender
identity caucuses. Many contemporary examples suggest that women
and people of color, as well as union democracy advocates and sexual
minorities, do not seek to bargain directly with the employer, but
instead seek to influence power in caucuses, through means that are
either extra-legal or legally invisible.5' These include: (1) rank-and-
file caucuses not sanctioned by union leadership; (2) work stoppages
unauthorized by the union leadership; (3) "union democracy"
caucuses; and (4) gay and lesbian caucuses. There are
interrelationships between these categories, but I will discuss each
category in turn.
252. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999) (Most
workers want a voice in workplace management, support unions, and want more
nontraditional forms of labor-management committees to run the organization and settle
disputes). These findings are buttressed by the AFL-CIO's internal surveys. African
Americans older than thirty-five, for example, are the strongest backers of unions, with
93% saying it is essential or very important to protect the right to join a union. AFL-CIO
REPORT, BASED ON A SURVEY BY PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, WORKERS'
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: WHAT WORKERS THINK ABOUT THEIR JOBS AND EMPLOYERS
28 (Sept. 2001); see also Gregory Defreitas, Unionization Among Racial and Ethnic
Minorities, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 284 (1993) (Blacks exhibit a markedly stronger
demand for union representation than whites, Asians or Hispanics).
253. See ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000) [hereinafter ORGANIZING
IMMIGRANTS].
254. "Legal invisibility" defines institutions that operate in the margins of social and
legal life, but whose existence does not violate any law. Wildcat strikes, except in cases
where worker safety is threatened, are almost always illegal. Union caucuses, on the other
hand, are not illegal, but neither are they recognized at all by statutory labor law. See Part
V infra. The caucuses in this Part are often not even officially recognized by their union.
This marginalization is compounded when lesbians and gays, who often lack the same
level of legal protection as other subordinated groups, form caucuses in their unions.
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(1) Rank-and-File Caucuses Not Sanctioned by Union Leadership
Several case studies show that workers, when they have had
differences with union leadership, have attempted to resolve those
differences through caucuses working to reform their unions.255 I have
already described some of the more revolutionary versions of these
reform caucuses, such as DRUM in 1960s Detroit. These
organizations did not work to establish a second channel for people of
color to bargain with the employer, but instead sought a radical
restructuring of their workplace. By contrast, modern caucuses not
sanctioned by union leadership have been able to achieve gains by
attempting to reform their unions. For example, in the United
Furniture Workers of America, Black and Latino/a caucuses worked
within the union to increase the representation of their constituencies
in union leadership.2 6  In Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees (HERE) Local 2 in the mid-1980s, reform caucuses of
Latino/a workers worked to educate the union on the need to
translate collective bargaining agreements and other vital union
documents into Spanish."7 By the 1990s, HERE was at the forefront
of immigrant organizing and providing multilingual representation to
workers in the service sector.258 HERE's changed attitudes toward
practices that marginalized people of color and women is not due
solely to the pressure of the caucuses, but the caucuses are another
255. PATRICIA ZAVELLA, WOMEN'S WORK AND CHICANO FAMILIES: CANNERY
WORKERS OF THE SANTA CLARA VALLEY (1987) (regarding Mexican cannery workers in
the Santa Clara Valley as they strive to build a rank-and-file caucus within the Teamsters
Union); DAN LA BOTZ, RANK-AND-FILE REBELLION: TEAMSTERS FOR A DEMOCRATIC
UNION (1990).
256. DANIEL B. CORNFIELD, BECOMING A MIGHTY VOICE: CONFLICT AND CHANGE
IN THE UNITED FURNITURE WORKERS OF AMERICA 191 (1989).
257. Hector Ramos, Latino Caucuses in US Labor Unions, RACE AND CLASS 68-78
(Spring 1986) (a study of insurgent Latino movements in three largely Latino unions); see
also Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael Merrill, Collective Bargaining in the Hospitality
Industry in the 1980s, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 447 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994) (discussing HERE's mixed record on gender and
race issues in the 1980s).
258. See Patricia Lee, Sisters at the Borders: Asian Immigrant Women and HERE Local
2, in BUILDING BRIDGES: THE EMERGING GRASSROOTS COALITION OF LABOR AND
COMMUNITY 38 (Jeremy Brecher & Tim Costello eds., 1990); Miriam J. Wells,
Immigration and Unionization in the San Francisco Hotel Industry, in ORGANIZING
IMMIGRANTS, supra note 253, at 109 (how immigrant incorporation into HERE Local 2
shaped the forms and outcomes of union mobilization); Lou Siegel, Local 11 Takes on
L.A., 20 LAB. RES. REV. 21 (1992) (regarding contractual protections for immigrants won
by HERE Local 11).
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example of how people of color and immigrants worked within the
union to achieve change.259
(2) Work Stoppages Not Authorized by the Union Leadership
Some informal groups or caucuses have chosen to deal with
dissatisfaction with their union by staging wildcat strikes and
unauthorized work stoppages. Wildcat strikes could be seen as
"working outside the union" because they are a direct challenge to
the union leadership and the employer. 26" However, it is unusual to
call such actions "separate bargaining." A wildcat strike may indeed
be a violation of the collective bargaining agreement that seeks to
change the union's position vis-d-vis the employer, but it is hard to
call it "bargaining" in the traditional sense because a wildcat strike is
not the kind of activity that receives the imprimatur of the legal
system the way that bargaining does.
Workers who engage in this form of protest usually have not
sought to bargain with the employer apart from their union.26' As one
example, the frustration of immigrant workers with a Teamster local
in Washington State led to a wildcat strike in June 1999.262 One of the
leaders of that strike, Maria Martinez, is now the chief steward of the
local.263 These and other workers who have engaged in wildcat strikes
have successfully transformed their unions from the inside.
(3) Union Democracy Caucuses
The goals and actions of caucuses of people of color and women
are similar to the "reform caucuses" present in many unions. These
259. Judicial interpretations of labor laws have contributed to these changes. In Retana
v. Apartment, Motel, Hotel, and Elevator Operators, Local No. 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023 (9th
Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that failure to provide translations of
essential union documents for Spanish speaking workers violated the duty of fair
representation. In Zamora v. Local 11, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, 817 F.2d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 1987), the same court held that where 48%
of the union membership spoke only Spanish, the Landrum-Griffin Act required
translators at union meetings. See David Gregory, Union Leadership and Workers'
Voices: Meeting the Needs of Linguistically Heterogeneous Union Members, 58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 115 (1989).
260. James B. Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and
Functions ofIndustrial Civil Disobedience, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 751 (1973).
261. See Magdelena Mora, The Tolteca Strike: Mexican Women and the Struggle for
Union Representation, in MEXICAN IMMIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S. 111 (Antonio
Rios-Bustamante ed., 1981).
262. Martha Gruelle, Teamsters Meat Packers Take on IBP with Little Support From
Their Union, LAB. NOTES, Aug. 1999, at 1 (wildcat strike involving Mexican, Central
American, Lao, Vietnamese and Bosnian immigrants).
263. Id.
groups are nationwide networks of union members committed to
"union democracy." Reform caucuses such as Teamsters for a
Democratic Union (TDU) and New Directions in the United Auto
Workers began in the late 1980s, seeking to make union leadership
more accountable, rather than seeking to bargain directly with the
employer or decertify the union. 64 Although these groups have
endorsed and utilized the weapon of wildcat strikes, their strategy is
more often a direct challenge to the union leadership than a demand
to bargain with the employer."'
Reform caucuses have been largely white and male, although
they have often supported the demands and struggles of workers of
color and women and are becoming more diverse. As part of the
"union democracy movement," Black workers formed a group called
the Black Rank and File Exchange (the "Exchange"), which had
chapters in Detroit, Milwaukee, and Chicago in the late 1980s but
then became dormant by the end of the 1990s with the loss of many
jobs in the auto industry.66 The caucus received support from Labor
Notes, a Detroit-based publication dedicated to union democracy.
Selwyn Rogers, the group's national chair, identified the group's
concerns as follows: "We feel that there's not a proportional Black
representation in our various unions. But we also feel that the union
leadership generally attracts Black leadership that tends to go along
with their mind-set and their way of running the union. '  The
Exchange shares the goals of the union reform movement and does
not endorse separate bargaining or decertification. At its height, the
Exchange counted about eighty members from a variety of unions in
its ranks. Membership dropped off in the early 1990s, but organizers
have recently begun a drive to renew the Exchange."
264. See LA BOTZ, supra note 255.
265. See MIKE PARKER & MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER:
REBUILDING UNIONS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 67-83 (1999).
266. Interview with Subject No. 10, supra note 250.
267. DAN LA BOTZ, A TROUBLEMAKER'S HANDBOOK: HOW TO FIGHT BACK
WHERE YOU WORK-AND WIN! 175 (1991) (quoting Selwyn Rogers).
268. Interview with Subject No. 10, supra note 250. Another rank-and-file group in
Detroit is called An Alliance of Ameritech Employees for Equality (AAAEE), comprised
of members of Communications Workers of America Local 4100. This group, along with
the union, filed a discrimination complaint against Ameritech in 1999. Kim Moody,
Telephone Workers Fight Discrimination at Ameritech, LAB. NOTES, June 1999, at 1. One
of the group's goals is the "restoration of union solidarity in the workplace." Id.
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(4) Rank-and-File Gay and Lesbian Caucuses
Gay and lesbian caucuses are alternative avenues of advocacy
within unions. Besides the AFL-CIO constituency group, Pride at
Work (PAW), rank-and-file lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) caucuses have organized in response to the lack of legal
protection for LGBT workers, and employer and union response to
homophobia in the workplace.269 For LGBT workers, caucuses have
been instrumental in putting gay rights on the bargaining agendas of
unions.270 One large caucus is the Lesbian and Gay Issues Committee
(LAGIC) of New York City municipal employees.271 In 1993, LAGIC
fought for and obtained domestic partner health benefits in contract
negotiations between its union and city government.272 According to
Desma Holcomb and Nancy Wolforth: "Caucuses are the best
vehicles for changing union policy and supporting a bargaining
agenda of nondiscrimination clauses and domestic partners (including
pensions). '27 3 These caucuses provide important examples for race-
and gender-oriented identity caucuses.
In sum, the history of caucuses and insurgent movements has not
borne out a need for the end of exclusive representation. Most
caucuses have not sought to bargain separately with their employer,
and wildcat strikes have been primarily a means to exert pressure on
the union's leadership in negotiations rather than a direct appeal to
the employer. However, it is unclear to what extent this orientation is
due to legal rules or notions of unionism that constitute the mythos of
the labor movement. Many union members, even those that are part
of reform movements, believe that unions should be reformed from
within, rather than by creating new unions. Even those who support
exit do not endorse direct bargaining with the employer, possibly
because of the labor ideology that no member should make
individualized deals with the employers. The question I now address
is whether members of identity caucuses, if given the choice, would
prefer to bargain separately if they became dissatisfied with their
unions.
269. See Holcomb & Wohlforth, supra note 129, at 11.
270. Id. at 15.
271. See Frank, supra note 141, at 96. LAGIC is part of American Federation of State
County Municipal Employees (AFSCME) District Council 37, which represents 110,000
New York City employees in fifty-six separate local unions. Id.
272. Tamara L. Jones, "Top Down" or "Bottom Up"? Sexual Identity and Workers
Rights in a Municipal Union, in OUT AT WORK: BUILDING A GAY-LABOR ALLIANCE
172, 188 (Kitty Krupat & Patrick McCreery eds., 2001).
273. See Holcomb & Wohlforth, supra note 129, at 12.
B. Field Research: The Reach of Exclusivity
(1) Why Field Research Is Needed
So far, I have shown in different examples that women and
people of color have chosen to resolve problems within their union
without attempting to go directly to the employer, or seeking other
representatives to intervene in the dispute. But one can glean only so
much about the nature of legal consciousness from what people do.
Consistent with the critical realist framework that I am taking in this
Article, the researcher must also ask the people who inhabit social
settings about their understanding of the legal constraints on their
behavior in order to determine the effect of legal rules. My
hypothesis is that the exclusive representative rule is not what keeps
workers of color and women from seeking to bargain with their
employer. Rather, it is a faith in traditional notions of unionism that
makes workers seek change from within.
In order to confirm this hypothesis, I surveyed and interviewed
women and people of color who are members of multi-union, AFL-
CIO-endorsed constituency groups such as CBTU, LCLAA, CLUW,
APRI, and internal union caucuses such as the SEIU African
American Caucus and the ATU Latino/a and Women's caucuses. I
also made contact with a multi-union group called the Black Rank
and File Exchange. I chose to focus on these groups for several
reasons. First, Marion Crain has identified these groups as potential
alternative representatives to unions if the system of exclusive
representation was ended.27" Second, even though the AFL-CIO and
its affiliated unions officially recognize some of these groups, groups
such as the Black Rank and File Exchange are informal, and not
officially sanctioned by union leadership. I chose to interview union
members and former union members in these groups because they
were most likely to know about the system of exclusive
representation and have an opinion about how bargaining worked.
Finally, although the orientation of some of these groups generally is
not to interfere in local union affairs, the nature of these groups lends
itself to providing assistance with individuals who are having
problems with their unions. So, the extent to which the members of
these caucuses would be willing to serve as bargaining representatives
274. See Labor's Divided Ranks, supra note 7, at 1617 & nn.372-74 (discussing the
potential role of community organizations including CBTU and LCLAA in representing
workers if exclusivity were repealed).
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for women and people of color will determine how successful a
nonexclusive bargaining regime would be.
(2) Scope and Methodology
I should first note some of the methodological aims and
constraints of the research. As I argued above, I do not purport with
this research to give the definitive answer to the question of whether
all workers of color or women would prefer to bargain with
employers in race- or gender-separate unions. The necessary sample
size to make that claim is beyond the reach of this limited study. Nor
do I aim to make such a claim even about members of race and
gender caucuses-for even though that number of workers would be
much smaller, I obtained a relatively small response to the 120
surveys that I distributed to members of race and gender caucuses
during 2001.275 Twenty-nine members of these caucuses participated
in my study. I conducted in-person interviews with seventeen of the
subjects and received completed questionnaires from twelve
additional individuals that I have not met. Thus, the sample is also a
mix of random and self-selected participants. I sent surveys to the
contacts I made throughout 2001 and asked them to distribute the
surveys to their members. Most of the subjects live in the upper-
Midwest states of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan. The only
exceptions were the surveys sent to the Asian Pacific American Labor
Alliance, which were sent to the Los Angeles Chapter, and a
respondent in Seattle, Washington. The research is intended to be a
starting, point for further inquiry, and even in its limited scope,
confirms the arguments and historical evidence that I have presented
above. That evidence was largely in the form of the statements of the
national leaders of the identity caucuses; many of them are national
leaders in the labor movement as well. In contrast, the purpose of my
field research was to get the perspective of more members of the
caucuses in local chapters, and to attempt to determine the extent to
which their perspective is shaped, or constrained, by legal rules such
276
as exclusivity.
275. The surveys were distributed as follows: Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (20);
Labor Council on Latin American Advancement (20); Asian Pacific American Labor
Alliance (10); A. Phillip Randolph Institute (20); Coalition of Labor Union Women (10);
Amalgamated Transit Union Women's Caucus (10); Amalgamated Transit Union Latino
Caucus (10); SEIU African American Caucus (10); and Black Rank and File Exchange
(10).
276. In this regard, I am attempting to discern the "legal consciousness" that members
of the identity caucuses have about the exclusive representation rule-the extent to which
(3) Observations and Survey Data
Because of the small size of my sample, and the varying degrees
of willingness to participate in the study, there are differences in the
demographic makeup of my subjects and the demographics of union
members as a whole. However, the demographics of members of the
identity caucuses are more difficult to determine, and the sample may
be closer to approximating those figures. My sample was 68% men
and 32% women. This differs from the ratio of men to women
members in unions, where, according to the latest data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 41% of union members are
women.27 Blacks comprised 43% of my sample, Latino/as totaled
36%, and whites and Asians were 10.5% each. The number of whites
in my sample, of course, is far lower than the nearly 77% that whites
comprise of total union membership, but that is to be expected from a
sample of this nature. The total number of Black union members in
2001 was approximately 14% and Hispanics were 9% of union
members in 2001. Whether the number of Asians tracks total union
membership is hard to determine because data about Asian union
membership is not available from BLS.
The interviews and surveys that I conducted have revealed that
twenty-eight of the twenty-nine subjects (96%) in the study feel that
bargaining is something that should be accomplished by the union,
rather than by caucuses or individually.7 8 However, a member of the
UAW, who believed that bargaining should be done on the "local
union level," also wanted his union replaced by the Black Rank and
File Exchange. He was the only respondent to want his current union
replaced.2 9 A consistent theme was the need for larger, broad-based
unions, rather than specialized unions, in the current economic
climate that unions face today. A Black female member of the A.
it is the chief barrier to separate bargaining or whether it is so ingrained that it simply is
the "'natural ... normal ... and... commonsense understanding" of how unions should
work. Merry, supra note 216, at 5; Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness:
Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW
& SOC. REV. 1055, 1059 (2001) ("Put simply, legal consciousness is how people think
about law.... Legal consciousness is also how people do not think about law; that is to
say, it is the body of assumptions people have about the law that are simply taken for
granted. These assumptions may be so much a part of an individual's worldview that they
are difficult to articulate.").
277. Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, Union Members in 2001 (Jan. 17, 2002).
278. This is based on the responses to Question 36 of my Survey Questionnaire, which
asked: "If you had to pick one, how do you think bargaining with your employer should
be conducted: (1) International Union level; (2) Local Union level; (3) Caucuses; (4)
Individually."
279. See Subject No. 10, supra note 2.
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Phillip Randolph Institute voiced a consistent theme when she told
me that "numbers mean strength."2" Another Black female, a
member of the Coalition for Labor Union Women, also expressed a
need for unity when she said that bargaining in identity caucuses
would not be better than the current system because everyone needs
to be united.28 Members of these caucuses seem to take for granted
that collective bargaining, no matter how it is conducted, will always
lead to the dissatisfaction of some. A Black male worker told me:
"I've been dissatisfied, but that's the collective bargaining process.
Unions are about raising all boats. One way to change the union's
positions on racial issues is more participation from Black
members."2 82
The number of workers who wanted caucuses to bargain on their
behalf was slightly higher when the subjects were in a hypothetical
conflict with their union. Seven subjects (24%) answered that they
would want identity caucuses to bargain with their union on their
behalf if they disagreed with the union's policies.283
I asked about the respondents' experience with discrimination at
the workplace to get an idea of how those experiences might affect
support for identity caucuses as bargaining representatives. Twenty-
nine of the people in the study (69%) reported having been
discriminated against in a job that they held. 84 Thus, most of the
workers that I interviewed had encountered some incident of racism
and/or sexism from the employer, fellow employees, and in some
cases, union staff and representatives. Although many pointed out
that such instances were more numerous in the past, there continued
to be contemporary occurrences of racism and sexism, even after
workers of color and women have achieved leadership positions in
their unions and in some cases a numerical majority. Members of
these groups have resolved disputes involving race or gender
informally, or by using the union's established procedures, rather
280. Interview with Subject No. 13, Black female member, A. Phillip Randolph
Institute and Communications Workers of America, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Aug. 24, 2001).
281. Interview with Subject No. 16, Black female member, Coalition of Labor Union
Women and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, in
Milwaukee, Wis. (Sept. 28, 2001).
282. Interview with Subject No. 7, Black male member, Coalition of Black Trade
Unionists, and American Federation of Teachers, in Madison, Wis. (Apr. 19, 2001).
283. Subject No. 10, supra note 2; Survey Response from Subject No. 19, Asian Pacific
Islander male, member of United Auto Workers, Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance,
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, and "similar Latino caucuses" (Nov. 10, 2001) (on file
with author).
284. Subject Nos. 14, 17, 19, 20.
than going directly to the employer or to the courts. The caucuses
have sometimes played a role in grievance processes, but tend not to
get involved in local politics. None of the workers in the study has
filed a charge or lawsuit with a government agency alleging race, sex,
or national origin discrimination."' Despite incidents of
discrimination, the people I interviewed generally preferred racially
integrated and gender diverse unions to bargaining units that were
comprised solely of members of similar racial and gender
backgrounds. A Black female member of CLUW, who reported that
she had been the victim of discrimination in promotions, said, "We do
not need to be separated. We need each other until we have the
power that we don't have'right now." '286 The subjects also stressed the
importance of identity caucuses in their unions. According to one
Black female: "I think caucuses are a place for whatever group to
bring forward minority issues that may not have been raised. They
are a way to bring attention, open doors, and have a conversation." '287
Finally, the subjects were asked whether they would vote to keep
the union, get rid of the union, or replace it with another union in a
decertification election. Twenty-eight of the twenty-nine subjects said
that they would vote to keep the union that they have now. These
findings are consistent with the extensive studies of Freeman and
218Rogers on worker attitudes toward unions .
Thus, workers in identity caucuses seem to have little trouble
with the legal regime that they have been dealt as far as exclusive
representation. Most groups have neither the desire nor the
institutional capacity to represent workers in dealings with their local
unions or employers. These organizations have no more than one
paid staff member and their members often serve in a representative
role in their own unions. In the case of nationwide networks like
CBTU and LCLAA, members may come from different unions and
industries and may find a difficult time relating to the industry or
285. This is consistent with other studies of the low incidence of sexual harassment and
discrimination claims, even in light of evidence that shows a high incidence of sexual
harassment and discrimination. Beth Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor
and Harassment in the Everyday Work World, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1151 (2000);
David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect of Rights: Career
Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (2001) (Relatively
few rights violations actually lead to explicit or formal invocations of the law; the primary
effect of the ADA on careers can be profound but is primarily indirect or symbolic.).
286. Subject No. 16, supra note 281.
287. Subject No. 11, supra note 1.
288. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 252, at 69 (finding 90% of union members
would vote to keep their current union).
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union-specific issues. In other cases, it might simply be an orientation
of non-intervention into local union affairs, one of the ideologies
cultivated over many years by the labor movement. In spite of this,
two of the people I interviewed reported that they had called the
union representative of a fellow identity caucus member who had
complained of poor representation by his local. Neither of the
respondents reported it going any further than that.
(4) Implications of the Study
My study focuses only on those union members who are also
members of identity caucuses. These union members might be
predisposed to certain attitudes about unions that make them less
likely than other workers to favor nonexclusive representation
schemes. As described earlier, many of the subjects in the study
currently hold or have held leadership positions in their unions, which
certainly explains a good deal of their faith in traditional unions.
However, my interviews suggest that women and people of color,
whatever their position in the union, have instrumental reasons for
favoring traditional unions over identity caucuses. The people that I
interviewed consistently voiced an opinion that they were better off in
broad-based, traditional unions, than by bargaining in identity
caucuses. This was evident in comments such as this one:
Numbers mean strength. A lot of things that we enjoy today would
not be possible without unions. I think for me personally, the union
has allowed me to have a good living status, and provided me with
the ability to get involved in a lot of arenas in which I would not
have gotten involved. 9
This quote exemplifies a commitment to a large, broadly-based
union because of the benefits, material and otherwise, that accrue to
people in unions. Gary Chiason and Barbara Bigelow's recent work
on commitment to unions also suggests that instrumental reasons are
important reasons why many union members support their unions.2"
The same person, when talking about why she was a member of the
A. Phillip Randolph Institute, also expressed ideological reasons why
she supports the union, and her identity caucus: "I believe in A.
Phillip Randolph's message, that we represent and encompass all
289. Subject No. 13, supra note 280.
290. GARY CHAISON & BARBARA BIGELOW, UNIONS AND LEGITIMACY 31-33
(2002).
people.... He had strong stands on labor unions.... He believed we
should have no boundaries of race, age, or ethnic background."29 '
This union leader, like many others in the study, is supportive of
her union. However, the views of rank-and-file members who have
never held any leadership position are consistent with those of the
union leaders that I surveyed. Further, I actively sought the views of
an explicitly rank-and-file caucus, the Black Rank and File Exchange,
though many of its members have held union leadership positions.
Despite its reformist stance, the views of members of this
identity/reform caucus on the role of the union in labor-managment
bargaining are not uniformly different than those of other identity
caucuses.
My research suggests that people of color and women do not
necessarily want race- or gender-separate bargaining units or
alternative representatives with the employer.292 Thus, it seems that
repeal of the exclusive representative rule is not what these workers
want. A cornerstone of the U.S. labor law system is employee choice.
Thus, if few workers desire identity caucuses instead of unions, a
change in legal rules would seem both unwarranted and ultimately
unsuccessful. Besides the interests of workers, however, there are
other reasons why repeal of the exclusivity might not be in the best
interests of workers of color and women. The rapidly increasing
share of workers of color and women in labor unions has resulted in a
larger number of women and people of color as leaders of local
unions. This trend only promises to increase. Indeed, only five of the
twenty-nine people in the study reported never holding any elected or
appointed union office.293
Further, it is important not to conflate the concepts of exclusivity
and majority rule. Exclusivity is a legal rule that governs the
relationship between the bargaining units certified by the National
Labor Relations Board. Majority rule is an ideology that has often, in
the name of democracy, been used to marginalize minorities and
women. The NLRB and the courts have never had a role in requiring
unions to operate by majority rule, proportional representation, or
any other internal governance system. The next Part, then, explores
what changes to the law of union governance might be appropriate to
291. Subject No. 13, supra note 280.
292. To reiterate, further research is needed to come to a definitive answer to that
question for all women and people of color. My research on the members of race and
gender identity caucuses, and other available evidence such as participation rates of
women and people of color in unions, suggests that the results would be similar.
293. Subject Nos. 1, 18, 20, 21, 23.
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enhance the voices of people of color and unions given that workers
do not seem to have a quarrel with exclusivity.
V. How New Voices Can Be Heard:
Representative Union Governance
"I won't be satisfied with the influence I have over union
decisions until I see diversity. There are no Blacks on my union's
executive board. The election process is not working." '294
Although my conclusion is that the repeal of exclusive
representation is not desired by, and indeed might be
counterproductive to, the interests of members of race and gender
identity caucuses, there are modifications to the law of internal union
governance that would serve the interests of member race and gender
caucuses, and would allow unions flexibility to design leadership
structures that approximate the race and gender makeup of their
unions. I have established that identity caucuses are not currently a
threat to internal union solidarity, nor do members of the caucuses
have a problem with the rule that makes the union the exclusive
bargaining representative. This Part examines whether the law of
internal union democracy can and should be reexamined to increase
the role of identity caucuses in union governance.
Even in exclusive representative systems, we should ask whether
and how law facilitates the existence of identity caucuses "as self-
identified collectivities... by creating structural arrangements
through which institutional power can be more effectively and equally
distributed among these various self-determined groupings." '295 Some
might argue that union members' satisfaction with the basic rule of
exclusive representation makes any changes to union governance
unnecessary. However, the case studies that I have presented where
reform caucuses sought to change unions suggest otherwise.
Although some unions, particularly on the West Coast, are
increasingly race and gender diverse in their leadership and rank-and-
file, there are many unions that continue to be dominated by white
men. As explained in Part IV, the composition of unions as a whole
294. Interview with Subject No. 1, Black male member, Laborers International Union
of North America (construction), and the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, in Madison,
Wis. (Mar. 17,2001).
295. Iglesias, supra note 7, at 483 (characterizing other internal union reform proposals
such as Eileen Silverstein's proposal for interest group certification and veto power over
majority rule union decisions, and George Schatzki's proposal to end exclusive
representation). See Silverstein, supra note 6; Schatzki, supra note 6.
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in 2001 was still 77% white and 59% male. 96 As described in Part II
above, several researchers have gathered evidence of entrenched
attitudes about the inability of women and people of color to be
union leaders.217 Although the top leadership of the AFL-CIO has
undergone change since 1995 when the New Voice leadership took
over, change is slow to filter into many local unions .29  Race- and
gender-conscious leadership structures serve important
representational needs besides cultivating labor's ties with civil rights
organizations.
Another reason why the content of union democracy must be
examined has to do with the exclusive representation principle itself.
If workers are bound by the results of union elections based on
majority rule, then they should have democratic rights to influence
the organization. If exclusivity were to be abolished, there would be
little reason for the relatively high level of government regulation
placed on unions relative to other membership organizations.2
Preserving union democracy, then, might be another reason to keep
exclusive representation.
Assuming unions are to be democratic, what level of union
democracy is required? In this regard, the battle is over
interpretations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (LMRDA or "Landrum-Griffin"). To some, Landrum-
Griffin is simply a morass of technical requirements that does not
further the cause of union democracy.3" To the reformers, the courts
have eviscerated Landrum-Griffin and its guarantees of formal
democracy such as freedom of speech within unions." '
296. See Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, supra note 277.
297. See Fletcher & Hurd, supra note 180.
298. The New Voice slate included Linda Chavez-Thompson, a Latina, as Executive
Vice President. Public employee and service sector unions now have several women and
people of color in their leadership. See Michael Goldfield, Race and Labor Organization
in the United States, in RISING FROM THE ASHES? LABOR IN THE AGE OF "GLOBAL"
CAPITALISM 87, 97 (Ellen Meiksins Wood et al. eds., 1997) (contrasting the public sector
union AFSCME with other unions that have been much slower to change their leadership
composition, even when their membership base has changed substantially).
299. See Clyde W. Summers, From Industrial Democracy to Union Democracy, 21 J.
LAB. RES. 3, 3 (2000) (noting the lack of social concern about democratic decision-making
in other social institutions such as corporations, chambers of commerce and groups like
the National Rifle Association).
300. See Estriecher, supra note 24 (Landrum-Griffin does not further the cause of union
democracy because of the low rates of member participation in unions); Fraser, supra note
24 (Landrum-Griffin should be rejected, in part, because it was passed with the help of big
business in order to weaken unions).
301. See Summers, supra note 299; Michael J. Goldberg, An Overview and Assessment
of the Law Regulating Internal Union Affairs, 21 J. LAB. RES. 15 (2000) ("[U]nion
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Since I argue for essentially keeping barriers to exit from unions,
it follows that voice mechanisms must be maintained and examined to
ensure that they function properly, especially for women and people
of color. Critical theorists have questioned whether long-held notions
of liberal democracy are adequate for the protection of women and
people of color, especially when they make up minorities within social
institutions.3 2 Given that the members of identity caucuses generally
do not wish to have identity caucuses bargain on their behalf, but
favor the role of caucuses in the labor movement today, the law of
union reform should allow caucuses full freedom of association, and
traditional unions should have the ability to design schemes that allow
for race and gender caucuses to have a role in union governance.
Unfortunately, a critical examination of the law of union democracy
shows its formal guarantees of democracy are indifferent to caucuses
and to race and gender diversity in unions. First, I will describe some
basic principles of Landrum-Griffin, how they have operated in the
context of dissident caucuses and plans to increase the representation
of women and people of color. Finally, I will put forth an alternative
vision of union democracy that takes into account race and gender
caucuses in unions.
A. Caucuses and the Law of Union Democracy
The Landrum-Griffin Act was passed in 1959 with the stated
purpose of ending union practices which "have the tendency or
,,303necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....
Congress also found "from recent investigations in the labor
management fields, that there have been a number of instances of
breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual
employees, and other failures to observe high standards of
responsibility and ethical conduct .... 3" As such, the Act gave
members the ability to inspect union records and immunity from
retaliation for testifying in any proceeding against the union."'
democracy is an important factor, perhaps a critical one, in protecting and preserving
democracy itself.").
302. See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Emperor's Clothes, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 21, at 205, 227; LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
303. 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1998).
304. Id. § 401(b).
305. Id. § 431(a).
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Section 2 of the Landrum-Griffin Act also provides for a "Bill of
Rights" for members of labor organizations, which includes the right
to free speech and assembly:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to
meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any
views, arguments or opinions; and to express at meetings of the
labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the
labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing
herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization
to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his
refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of
its legal or contractual obligations.6
The proviso to section 2 (italicized above) thus allows unions to
limit the exercise of free speech and assembly pursuant to
"reasonable rules" designed to further the union's contractual or legal
obligations. Such reasonable rules have allowed unions to enforce
discipline for dual unionism, belonging to more than one union at a
time, without running afoul of the free speech or assembly provisions.
While the right to form a caucus is protected by the free speech
or assembly provisions, there is reason to believe that unions could
use the "dual unionism" rule as a pretext to prevent identity caucuses
from obtaining power in the union.3 7 In recent cases involving
"reform caucuses," in fact, caucus members have been brought up on
internal charges for being in a caucus."' Even caucuses that are not
specifically "identity caucuses" but are made up of workers of color
may find union leaders are using dual unionism as a means to keep
the caucus from gaining power. This conflict erupted recently in the
International Longshoreman's Association (ILA) between a caucus
and the international union over the international's lack of
democracy and militancy.0 9 These disputes highlight the flaws in
Landrum-Griffin's formal promise of democracy, and the sometimes-
elusive character of the right to free association.
306. Id. § 411(a)(2) (emphasis added).
307. At least one court has held that Landrum-Griffin protects union members' rights
to form dissident caucuses. See Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers & Photoengravers
Union Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 1973).
308. Leah Samuel, Union Leaders Suspended for Being Part of Reform Caucus, LAB.
NOTES, Mar. 2000, at 1.
309. Carl Biers, Caucus of Longshore Workers Seeks Greater Democracy and Militancy,
LAB. NOTES, Aug. 2001, at 3.
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If Landrum-Griffin is to mean anything in practice, broad
principles like the right of free assembly must be given particular
content. This content must include the notion that effective
democracy requires unions to allow groups within them to flourish.
This egalitarian pluralist vision might seem to some to be a recipe for
faction, but as Joel Rogers and Joshua Cohen have argued, this might
make the institutions more democratic in the end.31 This can be
facilitated by explicit recognition of caucuses as an associative
element of union democracy in Landrum-Griffin.
Of course, the definitional problems of what is a "caucus" that I
have described in Part II above will hamper substantive reforms. The
difficulties are not intractable, however. To start, those constituency
groups that are officially recognized by the AFL-CIO, such as the
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists and others, could be considered
secondary associations that deserve protection. Other caucuses might
be recognized based on some minimum number of membership cards
signed by their members. Since most caucuses eschew the right to
bargain on behalf of their members with the employer, they will not
likely violate prohibitions against dual unionism. The caucuses would
still be subject to reasonable rules against dual unionism and
disloyalty, but the caucus itself would be a legitimate institution of
democratic union governance.
B. Race-Balanced Leadership and Landrum-Griffin's Neutral Principles
The cornerstone of Landrum-Griffin's union member's bill of
rights is the "Equal Rights" provision:
Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and
privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote
in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend
membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations of
voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organization's bylaws.311
By its terms, the equal rights provision applies to elections of
union officers. Another provision of LMRDA defines officers as
"any constitutional officer, any person authorized to perform the
functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other
executive functions of a labor organization, and any member of its
310. Joel Rogers & Joshua Cohen, Secondary Associations and Democratic
Governance, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 7-8 (Erik 0. Wright ed., 1995).
311. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).
executive board or similar governing body." '312 Courts have refused to
interpret the equal rights provision as requiring one-member, one-
vote systems.3 Thus, unions can experiment with cumulative voting
and proportional representation schemes in electing their leaders.
The reach of the equal rights provision has been tested when
unions attempted explicitly to make their governance structures
racially representative. For example, in Donovan v. Illinois
Education Ass'n, the teachers' union had set aside a minimum of 8%
of its elected Representative Assembly and four seats on the
governing board for Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and American
Indians.314 The board could appoint additional members of the
protected groups to the Assembly if these groups totaled less than 8%
after the elections. The Secretary of Labor sued the union, claiming a
violation of section 401(e), Landrum-Griffin's equal rights provision.
The district court agreed that the plan violated Landrum-Griffin, and
the union appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
In its opinion affirming the district court, the court held that the
plan would violate section 401(e) unless the union's justifications
could withstand close scrutiny. Judge Richard Posner, writing for the
court, rejected the union's justification for the plan. According to the
court, there had been no prior history of discrimination in the union,
and the union's distribution of seats did not match the racial or ethnic
composition of the union.315 The court was also disturbed by the
potential that the plan would be used for internal political
maneuvering and the absence of any mechanism to prevent such
maneuvering.316
Donovan has been criticized for its insensitivity to the labor
movement's earnest efforts to correct past and present racial
imbalances."' Other courts have also been wary of such plans as
possible violations of Title VII.3 8 Union affirmative action programs
312. Id. § 402(n). Business agents and shop stewards who solicit members, present
grievances and perform other ministerial functions, are not officers unless so designated in
the union's constitution. MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION
206-07 (1988) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 452.19 (2002)).
313. Denov v. Chicago Fed'n of Musicians, Local 10-208, 703 F.2d 1034, 1041 (7th Cir.
1983); O'Doherty v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & 8.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express &
Station Employees, 618 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1980); Fritsch v. Dist. Council No. 9, 493 F.2d
1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1974); Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 490 F.2d 133, 137-38
(10th Cir. 1973).
314. 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
315. Id. at 641.
316. Id. at 642.
317. See Goldberg, supra note 26; Iglesias, supra note 7; Mahoney, supra note 243.
318. See Shultz v. Local 1291, ILA, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972).
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designed to fill elective offices that are not carefully crafted are
subject to being voided by courts. On the other hand, a system of
proportional representation based on caucuses might be less subject
to attack. There is nothing in Landrum-Griffin that prohibits the
apportionment of seats based on proportional representation. In fact,
the court in Donovan faulted the union plan at issue because it was
not based on the proportions of racial and ethnic minorities actually
in the union. Because the caucuses function as "mini-democracies,"
there is also some protection against caucuses being used by the
leadership for political maneuvering, which was another concern of
the court in Donovan. Finally, because most caucuses admit
members of all races and sexes, the Title VII concerns that the courts
have had with union affirmative action plans are lessened. Thus, a
system of proportional representation based on caucuses would focus
more on membership in a secondary association to the union, rather
than a person's particular race or gender. This remedy is explicitly
race- and gender-conscious, and it could result in more diverse
leadership bodies within the boundaries of Landrum-Griffin's
promise of free assembly."9 It would also endorse a political vision of
identity, in the way that scholars such as Amy Gutmann, Lani
Guinier, and Gerald Torres have addressed the political dimensions
of race and gender identities."'
Of course, the ideal option would be for Landrum-Griffin to
explicitly legitimize voluntary affirmative action programs created by
unions as not in violation of the equal rights provision. Given the
reality of the political climate concerning affirmative action, however,
this alternative is not likely to be implemented at any time soon. In
the meantime, a system of proportional representation for caucuses
might serve the same purposes.
319. Under a program called The New Alliance, the AFL-CIO is encouraging state and
local labor councils to create opportunities for constituency group representatives to serve
on executive boards. A New Alliance, AFL-CIO AMERICA@WORK, Nov./Dec. 2001
(describing implementation of New Alliance plans in Maryland and Washington, D.C.,
with seats for representatives of AFL-CIO constituency groups on a new state federation
executive council); see also AFL-CIO, BUILDING AND LEADING A 21ST CENTURY
LABOR MOVEMENT, RESOLUTION 11 AT THE 24TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION, LAS
VEGAS, NEV., DEC. 2-5, 2001, available at http://www.aflcio.org/convention01/resolutions.
htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
320. LANI GUINER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER AND TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002) (articulating the concept
of "political race" as a transformative and aspirational tool); K. ANTHONY APPIAH &
AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 151-62
(1996) (arguing that race is consonant with representation in a democracy).
C. A New Vision of Union Democracy for Women and People of Color
In addition to the challenge of making Landrum-Griffin's
promise of formal democracy a real one that does not place
unnecessary burdens on unions, one must consider other ways to
conceive of "union democracy" and "democracy" that explicitly take
into account the needs of people of color and women. This means
going beyond concepts of formal democracy and majority rule that
critical theorists have argued do not always live up to their promises
for people of color and women.321 It would involve a greater role for
identity caucuses in unions, in everything from grievance processing
to bargaining. Several unions have Civil Rights Committees that hear
the grievances of protected groups. However, some have pointed to
these committees as simply controlled by union leadership. Members
of identity caucuses and constituency groups could serve in the role of
a third-party mediator when conflicts arise. If local unions are serious
about building bridges to the AFL-CIO's constituency groups, then
giving identity caucuses a more formal role in union governance
would be a good way to show that commitment. The lack of
institutional support of the constituency groups to maintain such a
function remains, but it is not likely that the demand for such
representatives would be overwhelming.
Unions could also give identity caucuses a greater role in
bargaining, either through designated seats on appointed bargaining
committees or through proportional representation in elections.322
These reforms could benefit all caucuses, whether or not they are
comprised mainly of women and people of color. However, the
problems described earlier in defining an "established" caucus would
make such a requirement difficult. Chapters of the officially
recognized caucuses of unions probably would not face definitional
problems. What about more informal caucuses? What standard
should unions use to decide whether to recognize caucuses, and by
what standard should the union's refusal to recognize a caucus be
enforced? To start, the AFL-CIO could encourage its affiliates to
recognize any of its official constituency groups as alternative
321. See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, FROM THE ASHES OF THE OLD: AMERICAN LABOR
AND AMERICA'S FUTURE 221 (1998) ("With some exceptions, rank-and-file and other
opposition groups have difficulty gaining equal access with the leadership caucus to the
union's newspaper and mailing lists, and often are forced to make complaints to the Labor
Department or to conduct lawsuits to bring leadership to heel.").
322. Robert Richie & Steven Hill, The Case for Propositional Representation, in
REFLECTING ALL OF Us: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 3 (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
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representatives of workers in its unions. As for more informal
caucuses, local unions could recognize any caucus that is supported by
at least 30% of the workers in a bargaining unit-the number of
workers required to file a decertification petition with the NLRB.
"Recognition" of a caucus by a union might include seats on the
bargaining committee, proxy authority at union votes, guaranteed
access to official union communications, and the right of workers to
choose caucus members as grievance representatives.323 Race- and
gender-designated seats on an elected bargaining committee would
violate Landrum-Griffin, but unions could draft their constitutions to
avoid this obstacle by making election by the caucus the touchstone
for a seat on the bargaining committee. Union practices such as these
would better serve the interest of union democracy than Landrum-
Griffin's sometimes-empty promise of formal democracy.
However, the prospects of amending Landrum-Griffin are as
bleak as any other labor law reform in the near future, so the best
intermediate step is for courts to recognize that unions can place
members of race and gender identity caucuses in positions of power,
without offending Landrum-Griffin or Title VII. Further, it should be
recognized that unions have a large degree of latitude in how they
structure their internal affairs, and that statutory amendments might
hamper, rather than encourage, experiments in representative union
governance structures. Thus, rather than requiring a certain kind of
leadership scheme, unions and caucuses should be encouraged to
experiment with a variety of different plans to have leadership bodies
that are more proportional and more reflective of their membership.
Finally, what about the fact that people of color and women are,
or will soon be, numerical majorities in many unions? One advantage
of a system of proportional representation of caucuses is that it
provides a democratic means of evaluating the commitment of people
of color and women union leaders to their constituencies. Instead of
simply relying on a leader's race or gender as a proxy for whether
workers of color and women are represented by the leadership, the
caucus system puts such questions to a vote of the members. Under
this scheme, the quality of representation is not merely measured
323. Others have advocated caucuses taking up such roles. See Michael D. Yates &
Patrick L. Mason, Organizing African Americans: Some Legal Dimensions, in AFRICAN
AMERICANS, LABOR & SOCIETY: ORGANIZING FOR A NEW AGENDA 87, 100 (Patrick
L. Mason ed., 2001) ("Members of African American caucuses should be included on
bargaining teams, at least for negotiating over racially sensitive issues."); Yelnosky, supra
note 25, at 613 (referring to the possibility of caucuses mediating in Title VII cases).
quantitatively, but in a deliberative process designed to keep leaders
of all races and sexes accountable to members.
Conclusion
At its core, this Article attempts to find an accommodation
between the need to recognize distinct and multiple identities within
unions, and the principles of collective strength to make unions
stronger and more accountable to their members. The leaders of the
labor movement recognize the need to recruit and retain women
workers and workers of color in order for the labor movement to
survive in the Twenty-First Century. In order to do so, the many
voices within unions need to be legitimated through recognized
caucuses that reflect workers' diverse and multiple identities. If one
accepts that law plays a role in shaping collective consciousness, a few
incremental reforms, and the revitalization of long-established rights,
would give women, people of color, and other minorities a greater
voice in their unions' affairs.
The labor movement today faces the question of its own survival.
The participation of women and people of color will be essential to
unions' survival and this is recognized by many of the new leaders of
the movement. Critical theory, history, and contemporary evidence
show that women and people of color are committed to unions but
want a reciprocal commitment to nondiscrimination and equity in the
governance of unions. In order for labor unions to survive in the
inhiospitable global economy, unions must become numerous enough
to compete on the scale of global corporations. The increased
numbers of new members needed, however, means that unions must
find new ways to keep their governance structures democratic and
representative of the diversity of the new movement. Identity
caucuses can serve important functions in this regard. Even though
official recognition of the caucuses presents the risk of co-optation,
they still represent an opportunity for race and gender consciousness
within unions. The multi-union composition of constituency groups
such as CBTU, CLUW, and LCLAA has the advantage of keeping
members from being co-opted by the leadership of any particular
local union, but it also minimizes the influence that caucus members
might have on local union matters. For this reason, members of
constituency groups should be more involved in local union matters
and the legal and ideological barriers to this involvement should be
removed.
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The labor movement is becoming less white and less male every
day. To some, this means that race and gender differences will no
longer be relevant to union organizing and governance and majority
rule will eventually correct the problems of racism. This view ignores
the fact that race and gender minorities have been a significant bloc in
organized labor for some years now, but there are still vestiges of
prior discrimination in place. Even when change does occur, there is
a danger that leaders who fit a certain race or gender profile will not
serve the members that they represent. There will always be the
option of "voting the bums out," but that will not always be a realistic
option.
In addition, there are other mechanisms besides majority rule
that unions can implement that would provide better representation
for people of color and women and better unions overall. I have
found an uneven level of involvement by identity caucuses in
traditional local union functions such as organizing and grievance
processing. Most identity caucuses are interested more in broad
policy issues than in representing workers on the local level. This
suggests that the identity caucuses would not be good substitutes for
traditional unions. However, identity caucuses should be given
greater legitimacy and power within unions. Whether or not that will
occur is largely up to the caucuses themselves and the willingness of
the labor movement's leaders to recognize the benefits and
importance of identity caucuses. Law, while not the sole determinant
of those changes, is an important factor in the equation that should be
examined for how it facilitates or hinders the distribution of power
within unions. Moreover, a critical realist account of the roles and
experiences of women and people of color within the labor movement
is needed even if the legal structure of union-management relations
remains unchanged.
The evidence that I have gathered shows that, far from being a
threat to union solidarity, identity caucuses in today's labor
movement are an important component of the diversity needed to
build the movement in the Twenty-First Century. In addition,
identity caucuses can also be important elements of union governance
and democratic union representation, and labor unions should
experiment with ways to incorporate them into existing union
structures.
Appendix: Methodology
In writing this Article, I conducted field interviews with
participants and gathered extensive first-hand impressions of the
Coalition Black Trade Unionists (CBTU) Chapters in Madison,
Wisconsin, and the Labor Council on Latin America for Latin
American Advancement (LCLAA) in Madison, Milwaukee, and
Janesville, Wisconsin, from Fall 2000 to Spring 2002.
I conducted private interviews with members of the chapters of
the A. Philip Randolph Institute (APRI), CBTU, and LCLAA in
Wisconsin, Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles. This group included
mostly union members, but I also interviewed some former union
members who were active participants in the CBTU and LCLAA.
My interviews with these individuals generally lasted approximately
one to one and one-half hours. I generally conducted these
interviews in person, though some were done on the telephone. My
questions focused on the views of union members in constituency
groups and the federal labor law regime in which they operate. The
interviews were confidential and each subject gave written consent
before the interview took place. Thus, I do not identify any of these
individuals by name.
I also spoke to people of color in a variety of smaller, more
specialized caucuses, such as the Black Rank and File Exchange, the
Amalgamated Transit Union Latino Caucus, and the African
American caucus of the Service Employees International Union.
Most of these individuals were current union members, though some
were former union members.
I made contacts for these interviews by attending various labor
conferences and being an active participant in the CBTU and
LCLAA. I made announcements at these meetings, and sent out a
letter to solicit subjects among these groups, and then followed up
with phone calls to specific individuals. Thus, some amount of
selection bias is present in the people I chose to interview. I sought to
account for this by using a standard interview form, but often the
standard questions seemed repetitive or inapplicable once the tenor
of the interview had been set.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54
November 2002] RACE AND GENDER IDENTITY CAUCUSES
The strengths and weaknesses of participant accounts as
evidence are a common theme in law and society literature. 24
Michael Burawoy has detailed the delicate balance that a participant
observer must walk between pure positivism-the idea that truth can
be ascertained in a detached scientific study-and postmodernism, or
the idea that nothing makes sense except with reference to the
subject.3 25 This line is even more difficult to walk for me because I
come to the study with a background representing labor unions as an
attorney and during the study I took a leadership role in a university
union. I tried to minimize my background by not assuming leadership
roles in the constituency groups, and by not surreptitiously steering
the group's agenda in a particular way. Moreover, I made sure that
people knew when they were "on the record" for my study, and
several times reminded people in these organizations that I was doing
a study on organizations like theirs.
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